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Note to the Reader: 
For the purposes of this essay, I have tried to adhere to a few conventions to make the 
reading easier. When referring specifically to a country’s aerial military organization, I 
capitalize the name Air Force. Otherwise, when simply discussing the concept in the 
abstract, I write it as the lower case air force. In accordance with military standards, I also 
capitalize the entire name of all code names for operations (OPERATION MATTERHORN 
or MATTERHORN). Air Force’s names are written out (Twentieth Air Force), the bomber 
commands are written in Roman numerals (XX Bomber Command, or simply XX), while 
combat groups are given Arabic numerals (305th Bomber Group). As the story shifts to 
the Mariana Islands, Twentieth Air Force and XXI Bomber Command are used 
interchangeably. Throughout, the acronyms USAAF and AAF are used to refer to the 
United States Army Air Force, while the abbreviation of Air Force as “AF” is used only 
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Introduction 
Curtis LeMay sat awake with his trademark cigar hanging loosely from his pursed 
ever-scowling lips (a symptom of his Bell’s Palsy, not his demeanor), with two things on 
his mind. Undoubtedly, he wished that he could find some good tobacco so that he could 
begin smoking his pipe again. But pipe tobacco could not withstand the muggy weather 
in the Mariana Islands where LeMay had been stationed since taking charge of the Air 
Force XXI Bomber Command in late January, so he took to the cheap cigars available in 
the Air Force PX. He promised himself that if all went well that night, he would break 
protocol and head over to the Navy PX where they had those fine Cuban hand-rolled 
cigars – after all, it was 1945, and there was no Castro to raise the ire of American 
politicians. While the loss of his beloved pipe surely weighed on the gruff LeMay, this 
was not what kept him awake on this night of March 9th. Rather, it was the knowledge 
that over 300 of his B-29 Superfortress bombers were headed under the cover of darkness 
and radio silence to undertake the largest, most daring, dangerous, and controversial 
United States aerial attack of the entire Second World War. And LeMay could not do or 
hear a thing about it until his planes completed their 3,000-mile round trip mission. 
LeMay intended to stay up until they returned to base.  But he feared that many or all of 
them would not. 
This was not the first time that LeMay sent planes over enemy territory. He had 
built up an impressive resume as both a flyer and commander, leading sorties in the 
European theater and directing the XX Bomber Command out their bases in China. The 
night’s mission against Tokyo’s urban center was unique for a number of reasons. First 
was the aforementioned target – Tokyo’s urban center – far removed from any of the 
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major industrial or infrastructure installations that had theretofore defined acceptable 
quarry for United States Army Air Force (USAAF) raids. Second was the unorthodox 
method of attack, involving a night-time radar-guided attack from altitudes between five- 
and nine-thousand feet, well below the 25,000 foot floor above which the B-29 with its 
four powerful Pratt and Whitney engines was built to dominate, and diametrically 
opposed to the well publicized USAAF doctrine of daylight raids with visual targeting.  
As if that was not enough, LeMay sent these planes – to the horror of the flyers, 
aircraft designers, and military strategists at home – with only one of their thirteen guns 
attached, to allow for increased payload. It was this payload which was perhaps the most 
significant aspect of the entire raid. Buried within the holds of each of the 325 bombers 
were 6 tons of incendiary bombs – mostly the 6.2 pound Mark 69 (M-69) Napalm tail-
ejection bomb, of which over half a million would be dropped during this one raid. While 
the M-69 had been used earlier in the war – sparingly by the Eighth Air Force in the 
European theater, more by the Fifth in the South West Pacific theater (New Zealand and 
Guinea), and increasingly by the XX and XXI Bomber Commands against Japan – this 
was the first major AAF raid to primarily employ the M-69 in a targeted assault on an 
urban area, with the goal of burning civilian dwellings to the ground. 
According to most historians of the Second World War and of the AAF, this 
attack – on the night of March 9-10, 1945 - was the essential turning point in the war in 
the Far East and a seminal moment in the history of American aerial bombardment 
policy. It would redefine the Army Air Force, and would lead to the nuclear attack of a 
few months later, to the devastating air assaults against Vietnam and Cambodia in the 
1960s, and to the complete domination of the skies over Kosovo in the 1990s. This 
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American adoption of “area” or “morale” bombing, which accepts and even relies upon 
inflicting widespread civilian casualties and devastating damage to urban communities, to 
thereby indirectly impede the State’s war making abilities and the people’s will to 
continue fighting, is often credited (detrimentally) to this singular decision by General 
LeMay on that one fateful night. Scholarship in the past few decades has gone a long way 
in historicizing his decision, recasting it as “the final link” in a long chain of theories of 
air-war and military planning. These ideas dated back to the inception of air forces in the 
1920s and to larger-than-life personalities of the Italian Giulio Douhet and the American 
airman William “Billy” Mitchell – the “prophets” of destruction from the air – and to the 
myriad planning and operations research committees which decided on targeting agendas 
for the Air Force during the war. 
While these studies shed a great deal of light on the history of aerial theory and 
clarify the contradiction between the AAF’s stated policy of “precision” attacks and their 
continued apparent disregard for the huge civilian toll of their air assaults, they do 
surprisingly little to explain why LeMay could or would at that singular juncture in time 
have undertaken this seemingly radical departure from stated procedure. If, as many of 
these histories indicate, American doctrine was not as opposed to “morale” bombing as it 
set-out to be, what changed to allow the night of March 9th, 1945 to be so radically 
different than any that preceded it?  Why should the U.S. still have adhered to the 
daylight bombing doctrine even as it partook in the much-maligned assault on Dresden 
just a month earlier, especially given the nighttime pummeling inflicted by the British 
Royal Air Force (RAF) on the nights immediately before and after the U.S. attack? 
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Indeed, the histories all do a fine job of establishing the theoretical basis and 
contextual grounding for LeMay’s decision, but appear to approach the decisions leading 
to the policy of area bombing in a surprisingly teleological way – describing decisions 
that were ‘finally’ made as if it were only a matter of time before area bombing became 
the dominant policy guiding the AAF.  And while it may well be true that there was a 
certain aspect of inevitability in the choice to bomb civilians – a growing callousness to 
death during a drawn-out conflict, the urge to do anything necessary to shorten the war by 
even a day – there is no single account of the many contingent aspects that persuaded 
LeMay to undertake this sort of attack in March of 1945. These include the changing 
political and popular environment back home, as much a result of the seemingly endless 
war as of reflections on the new “sub-human” Japanese foe, the newfound capabilities 
found with the B-29 bomber and proximity of the Mariana Islands, inter-service rivalries, 




Perhaps unsurprisingly, the vast majority of research conducted on United States 
Army Air Force bombing and strategic bombing in general during World War II has been 
dedicated to the campaigns in the European Theater of Operations (ETO). This is because 
over 75 percent of USAAF munitions used throughout the war were used against 
Germany and its allies, and the theory of strategic bombing was best illuminated against 
the backdrop of the British Royal Air Force Bomber Command’s indiscriminate and 
deliberate bombing of civilian centers. The USAAF’s – and specifically the specially 
formed Twentieth Air Force’s – own strategic campaign in the Pacific Theater, though 
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not totally ignored, has been given comparatively short shrift in the literature, mostly 
because of the overwhelming attention devoted to their use of the atomic bomb. Yet the 
nuclear attacks on Hiroshima and Nagasaki in early August 1945 were only a tiny 
fraction – and not even the most destructive – of the 26,401 effective sorties and 148,675 
tons of bombs dropped by the Twentieth against their primary targets (though pound-for-
pound, the atomic bombs were by far the most destructive). In many senses, the atomic 
attacks were the culmination of a trend begun half a year earlier in late February and 
early March 1945. Those months saw the inception of the USAAF policy of firebombing 
Japanese urban centers, a practice seemingly at odds with the well-publicized USAAF 
commitment to only engage in precision bombing of military targets. It is the 
circumstances of this evolution – from precision to area or “morale” bombing – that will 
be investigated in this study.1 
Not that this is the first to undertake such an investigation. Nearly all the histories 
dealing with the Twentieth Air Force’s bombing campaign against Japan have had to 
grapple in one way or another with the rhetoric of the USAAF versus the sometimes 
harrowing realities of General Curtis LeMay’s XXI Bomber Command’s incendiary 
attacks on the Japanese mainland. Not all histories, however, have come at it the same 
way. The earliest report on the campaign is found within the imposing seven volume 
official Army history, The Army Air Force in World War II, written by Craven and Cate 
beginning in 1948. The perspective largely mirrors that of the wartime AAF and though 
the authors were afforded access to the principal actors in the conflict, these opinions are 
understood to have underpinned their sympathy for ‘official’ Army beliefs. The 
                                                
1 United States Strategic Bombing Survey, Summary Report European and Pacific War, 84; Kenneth P. 
Werrell, Blankets of Fire: U.S. Bombers over Japan during World War II (Washington: Smithsonian 
Institution, 1996), 256. 
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incendiary campaign is described primarily as a precision attack focused on destroying 
the home-manufacturing capabilities of the Japanese. This claim was surely believed at 
the time by the involved actors, but hardly can mask the fact that AAF leaders knew of 
the untold thousands of innocents who would die in such an inherently indiscriminate 
“precision.” Still, they rely largely on primary documents that serve as the basis - and 
counterpoint – for most later studies (including this one) and clearly lay out the facts of 
the bombing. 
Curtis LeMay’s ghostwritten Ride with LeMay aims to explain the origins of his 
decision to switch to incendiary bombing and in general to clear his name from the 
negativity surrounding his command of the Air Force during Vietnam. LeMay defends 
the military necessity of the raids and argues that, if anything, the incendiary attacks 
hastened the end of the war and limited overall fatalities. Given his aim, he is 
understandably humble regarding the extent to which he invented the American 
incendiary attack. He does take credit – or blame – for the decision, but downplays its 
ingenuity, while simultaneously understating the importance of events that preceded him 
(though in his defense, he might not have been aware of them). In Superfortress: The 
Story of the B-29 and American Air Power, a later co-written book, LeMay delves more 
into the importance and evolution of the B-29 bomber, though his apologetic view 
obviously leaves much wanting.  
Later works responding to the revisionism of the mid 1980s revert somewhat to 
the party-line argument which asserted that military necessity dominated the decision to 
use incendiaries. Conrad Crane in Bombs, Cities, and Civilians downplays the extent to 
which the Air Force was already engaging in “area bombing” in the ETO. This extends to 
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his description of the Japan bombing, wherein he emphasizes the impression among most 
of the air force that, while civilian casualties were undesirable, they were the necessary 
outgrowth of the legitimate targeting of military and industrial targets – never the 
civilians themselves. 
Crane also sticks to a trend, found mostly in the biographies of the major Air 
Force figures, to overemphasize the importance of personnel – usually focusing on the 
switch between General Hansell and General LeMay in January 1945. Already mentioned 
above are LeMay’s two books. Iron Eagle, Thomas Coffee’s biography of LeMay’s life, 
provides a more extreme example. Haywood Hansell’s Strategic Air War Against Japan 
is a more evenhanded book. Part autobiography, part history, and part theoretical work, 
Hansell largely avoids the sort of griping about LeMay and his firebomb tactics that 
might be expected of someone fired from his job for what some consider to be his refusal 
to give up precision bombing. He gives due credit to the effect of firebombing, though 
concludes with an inflated analysis of what he views as the potential of precision 
bombing to have been as decisive as the incendiary attack had he been allowed to stay on 
and develop his tactics, which seems both anachronistic and impractical. 
An excellent essay by Thomas Searle in Journal of Military History (and winner 
of the 2003 Macando Prize from the Society of Military History) is “It Made a Lot of 
Sense to Kill Skilled Workers.” Searle correctly points out the lack of attention in the 
literature on the Japanese bombings to the years of planning documents the preceded the 
war, and based on them he convincingly attacks the notion that (a) there was a real switch 
in policy from Germany to Japan and (b) that LeMay’s arrival was the key to the switch 
to incendiaries. Nonetheless, Searle’s all-too-personal attack on General Hansell 
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(mocking Hansell’s displeasure at being fired, Searle quips the real “tragedy was 
Hansell’s narcissism and complete lack of self-awareness,” a claim I have not 
encountered elsewhere in the record), the sweeping negation of LeMay’s brilliance in 
changing tactics, and his oversimplification of the composite pieces within the USAAF 
planning division are notable shortcomings.2 In addition, Searle’s most contentious claim 
is that the Air Force leaders both knew about and desired the high civilian casualties that 
would arise from urban incendiary attacks. Indeed, he shows conclusively that civilian 
casualties and weakened morale – especially among factory workers – were a desired as 
indirect effects of the bombing, but he subtly turns that into an argument that the Air 
Force wanted to kill civilians. It is quite apparent, however, that while casualties were 
guaranteed to result from this sort of attack, the probability of deaths and morale changes 
would vary significantly based on a host of variables out of the control of the Air Force. 
Searle effectively wades into the revisionist debate over the morality of the 
bombing, explaining that the USAAF intended to kill large numbers of civilians as an 
oblique yet efficient way to shut down the Japanese war industry and economy. Thus it 
amounted to an attack on industry (with military merit) and consequently did not 
constitute a switch to “morale” bombing. This of course is in contrast to the two seminal 
revisionist works of the 1980’s – Michael Sherry’s The Rise of American Air Power and 
Ronald Schaffer’s Wings of Judgment. Both Sherry and Schaffer argue that the U.S. was 
by March 1945 engaged in an immoral deliberate attack on the citizens of Japan, in an 
effort, not to destroy the Emperor’s war making ability, but to terrorize his people into 
demanding his surrender.  
                                                
2 Searle, “It Made a Lot of Sense to Kill Skilled Workers”: The Firebombing of Tokyo in March 1945, 
Journal of Military History 66 (2002), 132. 
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Shaffer is the more moderate of the two, describing the USAAF’s initial choice of 
the precision doctrine as one mostly of efficiency, not morality. Like Hansell, he 
considers the effectiveness of the incendiary attacks in destroying precision targets to 
have been less impressive than the capabilities of conventional bombing, and thus 
questions the morality of continuing the attack on civilians. Sherry, on the other hand, 
claims that the gradual shift towards area bombing somehow led the USAAF leaders to 
harbor delusional views about the bombing’s toll on civilians and to ultimately continue 
the incendiary campaign where they “waged destruction as a functional end to itself” 
(measured in square miles), “without a clear comprehension of its relationship to stated 
purposes.”3 Sherry calls it “technological fanaticism,” diagnosing it as an almost 
psychological condition shared by the entire Air Force leadership, a “disjunction between 
means and ends” whereby the USAAF regarded  “the decisions that took lives as the 
products of technological, strategic, and bureaucratic imperative.”4 
More recently, a more balanced accounting of area bombing entitled Bombing 
Civilians: A Twentieth Century History was put out as a collection of essays edited by 
Marilyn Young (more famous for her very critical book on the U.S. in Vietnam) and 
Yuki Tanaka. It includes essays by both Schaffer and Sherry, but the book essentially 
                                                
3 Michael S. Sherry, The Rise of American Air Power: the Creation of Armageddon (New Haven: Yale UP, 
1987), 252 
4 Ibid., 253. Sherry goes on to describe the “evil of American bombing” as “a sin of a peculiarly modern 
kind because it seemed so inadvertent, seemed to involve so little choice. Illusions about modern 
technology had made aerial holocaust seem unthinkable before it occurred and simply imperative once it 
began. It was the product of a slow accretion of large fears, thoughtless assumptions, and at best discrete 
decisions.” What is striking about Sherry’s argument is both the depth of his research and the extent to 
which he simultaneously appears to call upon and reject the agency of USAAF actors. It seems 
questionable to me, at least, to rely on the memoranda and reports of Air Force officials to establish a moral 
accountability while denying that those very individuals ultimately had any control. If that is the case, who 
is “evil” and who has “sinned?” I quote here at length both to showcase the extreme nature of Sherry’s 
views and also because I aim to argue that technological determinism – where practical strategy followed 
the functional capabilities of the Air Force – was a driving force behind the incendiary raids. And I want to 
be clear about the distinction between Sherry’s theoretically postulated behavioral disorder and, to be frank, 
my more useful look at the active formation of airpower doctrine given specific limitations and capacities. 
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splits between those attempting to document the objective facts of the bombing and those 
attempting to put it into a moral perspective, which relieves it of some of the tension 
found in Sherry’s book. Not so with moral philosopher A.C. Grayling’s book Among the 
Dead Cities, which relies on a loose definition of military necessity and an even looser 
understanding of the realities of war to call the firebombing of Japanese cities (and even 
more so the RAF attack on Dresden and the USAAF nuclear attacks)  “morally criminal.” 
He then goes even further and asserts that “there comes to seem very little difference in 
principle” between these sorts of attacks “and the destruction of the World Trade Center 
in New York by terrorists on 11 September 2001.”5 Grayling is less interested in the 
actual circumstances of the war than in making a contemporary critique. As a Sunday 
Times reviewer noted, “one suspects that it is British and American pilots operating over 
Afghanistan, Iraq and, perhaps, Iran whom the professor would like to see in the dock 
rather than the elderly veterans of Bomber Command.”6 
Most helpful have been a number of books dedicated solely to the incendiary and 
nuclear attacks on Japan. The newest addition, Barrett Tillman’s Whirlwind: The Air War 
Against Japan, 1942-1945 offers a greater insight into the experience of actual airmen, as 
well as delving more deeply into the role of the XXI Bomber Command in the hugely 
important Navy blockade of Japanese harbors. The blockade was first seriously dealt with 
in Blankets of Fire by Kenneth Werrell, in which he argues convincingly that the USAAF 
made a mistake in their reluctance to assist with aerial mining during the blockade. He 
credits the incendiary attacks with spreading destruction, but asserts that the mining and 
                                                
5 A.C. Grayling, Among the Dead Cities: Was the Allied Bombing of Civilians in WWII a Necessity or a 
Crime? (London: Bloomsbury Publishing), 2006, 271; 278.  
6 Michael Burleigh, review of Among the Dead Cities, by A.C. Grayling, The Sunday Times, February 5, 
2006, http://entertainment.timesonline.co.uk/tol/arts_and_entertainment/books/non-
fiction/article723772.ece. 
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blockade was what actually crippled the Japanese economy – not the firebombing. 
Werrell began an important line of inquiry, but did not sufficiently probe the tenuous 
relationship between the powerful U.S. Navy and the fledgling Air Force.  
E. Bartlett Kerr’s Flames over Tokyo is the only book to look seriously at the 
development of the incendiary bombs and the impact of non-military operations analysis 
groups in shaping targeting priorities and thus the nature of the airway in Japan itself. His 
approach is crucial to shaping my understanding of the bombing campaign, though he 
overplays the importance of planning and position papers to LeMay’s ultimate decision to 
change tactics and understates the precarious standing of the M-69 in Army tactician’s 
plans. 
*** 
This thesis aims to correct the imbalance found in the literature of works focusing 
on the theoretical air policies and then the actual implementation of them, as if an 
imperfect match between theory and practice necessarily reveals some sort of failure in 
the execution. The switch to urban attacks is often portrayed as either (a) an abandonment 
of Air Force doctrine or (b) a change of Air Force doctrine. Rarely is it considered that a 
more nuanced middle ground exists, wherein doctrine is more fluid and implementation 
more variable and responsive to circumstances in the field. This paper will thus stress the 
essential contingencies found not only in LeMay’s decisions but also in the planning for 
the war itself. 
Chapter One will establish the intellectual framework for the Air Force doctrine 
as it emerged through the 1930s and early 40s. It will outline the way in which the war 
planners conceived of strategic bombing in terms of precision attacks, and investigate the 
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nature of the strategic-precision relationship, with particular focus on the underlying 
premise of efficiency of attack. It will continue to describe the process by which this 
doctrine was inserted into the official United States war plans and will address the unique 
political considerations of the Air Force during the decades leading up the war. 
Chapter Two will be a sustained analysis of the first attempts to enact the Air 
Force’s vision in the Pacific War. Central to the discussion will be the creation of the 
quasi-independent Twentieth Air Force and the state-of-the-art B-29 Superfortress 
bomber. It will explain the rationale for and the limited success of the XX Bomber 
Command in China, as well as describe the lessons learned from the ETO that impacted 
the China mission and further the lessons learned from China that would impact the 
Mariana campaign. 
It is this campaign – particularly the incendiary attacks which began after March 
9th, 1945 – that is the subject of Chapter Three. It is split into three main sections (1) 
proximate causes for the switch to incendiary attacks, (2) the attacks themselves, their 
rationale, and their impact, and (3) a more long-term investigation of the peculiar way 
through which incendiary attacks became incorporated into Air Force doctrine, with a 
focus on two civilian-led planning groups. 
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Part I: The (Practical) Prophets 
Any serious history of the United States bombing campaigns of WWII and after 
must begin with a discussion of the doctrinal legacy left for the Air Force by the time the 
war began. Aviation had been around for less than forty years before the attack on Pearl 
Harbor and U.S. entry into the war and during that time had expanded impressively - 
though not as much as Air Force promoters deemed sufficient. Most analysis of the 
USAAF revolves around two seminal figures in the history of air war – the Italian airman 
Giulio Douhet and the American Army Air Corps leader William “Billy” Mitchell. I 
carefully say figures in the history of aeronautics, because their importance appears to be 
as much a result of actual influence as of later historians imbuing them with significance, 
mythologizing them as the “prophets” of the air. Indeed, while some of the later 
revisionist histories try to qualify their importance, they do so while still firmly 
embedding them in the center of air doctrine (and, almost without fail, the first few pages 
of their books).7 
This is not to say, however, that these authors are mistaken in crediting these two 
– among others – with offering some of the first (usually) coherent thoughts on the uses 
of airplanes in war, or that subsequent doctrine enshrined by the United States Air Corps 
Tactical School (ACTS) was not indebted to them. Nor will I deviate from this well-tried 
                                                
7 See for example, Conrad C. Crane, Bombs, Cities, and Civilians: American Airpower Strategy in World 
War II (Lawrence, Kan.: University of Kansas, 1993), 15-18; Ronald Schaffer, Wings of Judgment: 
American Bombing in World War II (New York: Oxford UP, 1985), 21-30; Barrett Tillman, Whirlwind: the 
Air War against Japan, 1942-1945 (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2010), 9-14; Kenneth P. Werrell, 
Blankets of Fire: U.S. Bombers over Japan during World War II (Washington: Smithsonian Institution, 
1996), 9-11; Stewart Halsey Ross, Strategic Bombing by the United States in World War II: the Myths and 
the Facts (Jefferson, NC: McFarland & Company, 2003), 35-45; Michael S. Sherry, The Rise of American 
Air Power: the Creation of Armageddon (New Haven: Yale UP, 1987), 22-38. Sherry provides the longest 
but also most comprehensive analysis of these men, focusing on their political and cultural context as well 
as their theories. While ultimately his conclusions regarding the U.S. bombing are rather extreme, his is 
among the most extensively researched, if meandering, work done to date.  
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path of establishing some basis for subsequent USAAF policy, though my analysis will 
focus on substantially different aspects of their ideas.  
While I will give brief attention to the innovations of these two theorists, more 
interesting in their schema are the aspects that are indicative of their role as airmen – not 
intellectuals.8 That is, within their proposals there is the palpable sense of the chip on 
their shoulders, the feeling that they are being unduly ignored and unfairly treated by the 
Army and Navy – their bigger ‘siblings’ in the military establishment. This is found in 
both Mitchell and Douhet, and is thus not unique to U.S. institutions. Nonetheless, it 
would prove to be a particularly important aspect of the decision to use incendiary bombs 
against Japanese cities. 
Douhet’s conception for the future uses of the air force was premised on a keen 
understanding of the nature and purpose of armies. The Italian Commissioner of Aviation 
under Mussolini, General Douhet distilled war into a conflict between one “party who 
wants to occupy a certain portion of the earth” and “his adversary, the party who intends 
to oppose that occupation.”9 The attacking army tries to reach the region it hopes to 
overtake, and the defending army positions itself along the lines they expect the attackers 
to choose in their assault. Thus, in order to reach their target, the attackers must first 
overcome the defending army. “Since war had to be fought on the surface of the earth,” 
Douhet goes on, “it could be waged only in movements and clashes of forces along lines 
                                                
8 Compare, for instance, Curtis LeMay’s handling of Mitchell in Superfortress: the Story of the B-29 and 
American Air Power (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1988) which discusses in detail the story of Mitchell the 
airman, provocateur, and pain in the Army’s side, but never once mentions Douhet or much in the way of 
Mitchell’s actual theories. This favoring of action over words is especially apt given air force fliers’ 
reputations as young whippersnapper cowboys exploring the new frontier of the sky, in distinction to the 
more established Army and Navy. LeMay will evoke this sentiment again and again against the “armchair” 
establishment in the military.  
9 Giulio Douhet, The Command of the Air. Trans. Dino Ferrari (Washington, D.C.: Office of Air Force 
History, 1983), 8. 
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drawn on its surface.”10 By default, then, war came to be understood as the battle with – 
and the dominance over – a rival military force, a fact that Douhet thinks belies the real 
intent of the conflict: “to invade the enemy’s territory” and force the nation’s surrender.11 
With the advance in aeronautics, however, “it is possible to go far behind the 
fortified lines of defense without first breaking through them” and to strike directly at the 
civilian centers. During a war, 
no longer can areas exist in which life can be lived in safety and tranquility, nor can the battlefield 
any longer be limited to actual combatants. On the contrary, the battlefield will be limited only by 
the boundaries of the nations at war, and all of their citizens will become combatants, since all of 
them will be exposed to the aerial offensives of the enemy. There will be no distinction any longer 
between soldiers and civilians. The defenses on land and sea will no longer serve to protect the 
country behind them [italics mine].12 
 
Douhet’s purposes here are twofold. As a true believer in the power of airplanes, he 
wants to demonstrate the extent to which an air force fundamentally changes not only the 
practice, but also the rules of war (who is a combatant, where is the battlefield, etc.). In 
the process of doing so he delves into the details of what future wars should look like and 
how they should be executed. But more than that – perhaps even primarily – as an airman 
himself, Douhet wants to establish the basis for an independent air wing. Thus, the 
throwaway line challenging the efficacy of the traditional defenses in the face of an air 
assault is anything but secondary. In fact, at the very beginning of his work, before 
Douhet ever establishes the capabilities of an air force, he recognizes that the Army and 
Navy have their own planes, “but that does not preclude…the necessity of having an air 
force capable of accomplishing war missions solely with its own means” and that “an air 
force should logically be accorded equal importance with the army and navy.”13 
                                                
10 Ibid. 
11 Ibid., 9. 
12 Ibid., 9-10. 
13 Ibid., 5. 
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Essentially, Douhet is writing a polemic whose aim is not simply to elucidate the benefits 
of the air force, but to precipitate the downfall of the other services from their perches of 
preeminence. 
Douhet was not shy about what methods he deemed acceptable or the effects he 
hoped to realize. With all citizens turned into combatants, all targets would be fair game. 
For practical purposes – much like the ACTS doctrine that would follow a decade later – 
“industrial and commercial establishments” would be of primary importance, but “certain 
designated areas of civilian population” would be singled out as well. The choice of 
munitions was equally flexible, and explosives, incendiaries, and even poison gasses 
would be used as the situation called for it.14 The effects of large-scale bombardment, 
where tens of tons of incendiaries, explosives, and poison gasses were dropped on a 
population center would have devastating effects on the morale of a nation – effects that 
Douhet felt “may well have more influence upon the conduct of the war than their 
material effects” that is, the actual infrastructure destroyed.15 In what would become a 
highly contested thesis among historians, and whose premise underlay both OPERATION 
CLARION in the ETO and the late June and July attacks in Japan, Douhet expands on the 
interaction between bombing and civilian morale. The inability to predict either the 
locations or the numbers of cities next to come under air assault would lead to “a 
complete breakdown of the social structure…in a country subjected to this kind of 
merciless pounding from the air. The time would soon come when, to put an end to the 
horror and suffering, the people themselves, driven by the instinct of self-preservation, 
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would rise up and demand an end to the war,” and in a final dig at the establishment, he 
adds “this before their army and navy had time to mobilize at all!”16 
Douhet’s theory of airpower centered on understanding the airplane as “being pre-
eminently an offensive weapon” and in fact “not adaptable to defense.”17 However, for 
reasons political and strategic, Billy Mitchell primarily stressed their defensive 
capabilities. Promoted to a wartime rank of Brigadier General and Assistant Chief of the 
Air Service upon his return from fighting in the First World War (when the Air Signal 
Corps was still firmly entrenched within the Army), Mitchell immediately became a 
vocal proponent of an independent air force, and by at least some metrics, was 
successful.18 A less qualified theorist than Douhet, Mitchell’s importance was as an 
effective showman and publicist, though his views are important because they animated 
his actions, and he would become somewhat of a martyr for the next generation of air 
leaders, as well as a stumbling block because of all the enemies he aroused along the 
way.19 
Mitchell argued that with the advent of the airplane, and all the capabilities that it 
had (see Douhet), “interior cities are now as subject to attack as those along the coast. 
Nothing can stop the attack of aircraft except other aircraft.”20 Rather than begin as 
Douhet did by explaining that the aircraft was an unstoppable offensive weapon, Mitchell 
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explained that because of this fact, it was even more crucial for the defense against 
enemy planes. Implicit is that airplanes could be used offensively, and would overwhelm 
any existing defenses. He made this argument for political and practical reasons. 
Practically, as Mitchell wrote his thoughts in the mid 1920s, the U.S. Air Corps had no 
aircraft even remotely capable of reaching Europe – most had a flying range of little more 
than a few hundred miles.21 Politically speaking, the inter-war period in the United States 
was a time of retrenchment, isolationism, and intense demilitarization. No argument for a 
greater offensive reach would resonate with the public. An appeal towards their security – 
the ability to keep foreign forces out – could very well elicit a positive response. Thus 
Mitchell carefully asserted that “an efficient air force…would be able to protect the 
country from invasion and would secure its independence, but would not be able to 
subject a hostile country to invasion.” Conversely, “no seacraft…is able to contest their 
aerial supremacy.”22 
Not only did Mitchell attempt to usurp the Navy’s long heralded role as protector 
of the nations coasts, but he tried to “consign…naval power (except submarines [largely 
protected from aerial attacks]) to the deep sea of obsolescence.”23 He exaggeratedly 
predicted the demise of navies, which would be left to “control only the areas of water 
outside of the cruising radius of aircraft. These areas are constantly diminishing with the 
increasing flying powers of aircraft…. The surface ship, as a means of making war, will 
gradually disappear.”24 The Navy might have been able to dismiss this blather as the 
ravings of a fanatic, but Mitchell targeted what the navy brass surely held most dear: their 
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coffers. “The advent of air power,” he conjectured, “holds out the probability of 
decreasing the effort and expense required for naval armaments.”25 Thus under fire – 
especially during a time of decreasing military expenditures in America – the Joint Chiefs 
could no longer countenance his official blasphemy, and had him defrocked. Of course, 
the spectacle of his court-martial would effect the future of the Air Force as much as his 
theories, specifically because his defense relied (poorly, it seems) upon the testimonies of 
two young airmen – Majors Henry Arnold and Carl Spaatz – destined to become the top 
two officers in the USAAF.26 
Clearly, Mitchell did not pull his punches when discussing the Navy, and aside 
from theoretical posturing, he engaged in some very real tests to establish the supremacy 
of aircraft over a sea fleet. The descriptions of these myriad ocean bombing 
demonstrations – culminating in the spectacular July 1921 sinking of the “unsinkable” 
former German dreadnaught Ostfriesland – take up a sizable portion of his book, yet 
another reason to think of him as less a theoretician than a publicist.27 These descriptions 
are spread over 50 pages in two chapters, the latter of which was entitled “The United 
States Air Force [n.b. – which did not yet exist] Proves that Aircraft Dominate Seacraft.”  
The Navy, which was incredulous of Mitchell’s claims from the very start (so much so 
that before the trials, the Secretary of the Navy announced “that he was willing to stand 
on the bridge of the ship” as Mitchell’s planes bombed it28), was quick to call the trials a 
fluke, and pointed out that real life would not include a lone ship anchored in the open 
seas. Indeed, there was reason to be skeptical. Hitting a precisions target was hard 
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enough, even without the Navy’s carefully scripted test conditions intended to make them 
most difficult for the fliers, such as positioning the ship 75 miles off the coast, a 100-mile 
trip from the landing strip.29 But the success further buoyed Mitchell’s confidence, 
leading to his eventual court-martial and slow decent into obscurity until his untimely 
death in February 1936 at the age of 56. 
As far as the particulars of his theory go, Mitchell did not leave an especially 
large footprint. His primary interest was to establish an independent air force, and he 
tailored his conception of the uses of airplanes to fit into the unique interwar-U.S. ethos 
during which he was prominent. This meant a stress on the defensive aspects of airplanes, 
but an intentional vagueness about their general capabilities, to allow for the shift from 
defensive to offensive action. This helps explain his elusive definition of air power as 
“the ability to do something in or through the air,” a contention so pedantic so as to make 
it worthless, unless we recognize that Mitchell was trying to carve out the greatest space 
for aerial operations without upsetting too many people. His antics proved to make him 
less successful at this last goal. It explains as well the absurdity of his oft-quoted 
assertion – used to challenge his grasp of the real workings of air power – that “a few gas 
bombs” would be more than enough to send a city into a paroxysm and quickly win the 
future air war.30 Confidence in the ease as well as abstract nature of future wars, wars 
involving technologies that perhaps did not yet exist, would limit the outcry among the 
American populace and increase the likelihood of receiving some leeway in expanding 
his beloved Air Corps. It was in this way that he hoped to free aircraft from their position 
as tactical resources – ones supporting military action in the field – towards a goal of 
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strategic action, in which they themselves would bring the war to the enemy and 
undermine their ability to continue fighting at all – not simply in a particular skirmish.31 
He was far from an original or even careful thinker, but he was a skilled public relations 
artist, and the history must frame his theory within the understanding of the inter-service 
and political – rather than simply the theoretical – challenges that he faced. 
And it would be Mitchell’s battle for this goal that would live on in the minds of 
the leaders of the USAAF. LeMay met Mitchell only once, around 1930 when LeMay 
was still a second lieutenant, and recalls that, while they “held him in very high regard,” 
“we didn’t say ‘this is a very holy man’; we just believed in what he said.”32 It was not 
his contention that cities should be gassed that animated LeMay and others, but his 
staunch defense of the idea of strategic air power, and therefore the necessity for an 
independent, unified command structure to organize a proactive, rather than reactive 
tactical support force. 
 
A Doctrine Enshrined 
As Douhet and Mitchell were busy publicizing their views on the future of air 
power, the U.S. Army Air Corps was concerned with the immediate definition of the role 
of the airplane. Like the two theorists, the Air Corps was interested in the independence 
of their branch, but before that could be achieved, they had to develop a practical fighting 
doctrine. Through the 1930s, the Air Corps was still a part of the Army, and therefore had 
no official mechanism for establishing doctrine. The elite officers of the Air Corps went 
through the Army’s West Point Academy, and the Army resolutely maintained that the 
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airplane was to serve a tactical purpose in support of ground forces, and thus did not need 
a distinct fighting policy.33 Thus, the best sense of directions that the Air Corps received 
was from the semi-formal air strategies taught in the Air Corps Tactical School (ACTS). 
It is hard to overstate the absolute rejection of an independent air force that 
animated all American centers of power during the inter war period. As late as 1935 – by 
which point, as we will see, ACTS had formulated a coherent argument for independence 
– former Secretary of War Newton D. Baker presided over a review board which 
categorically denied the merits of Air Corps independence. The board’s conclusions 
would guide President Roosevelt’s thoughts on the Air Corps until 1939, when the 
specter of a world war fought with increasingly powerful weapons became impossible to 
discount. But back in 1935 Baker found that “the ideas that aviation, acting alone, can 
control sea lanes, or defend the coast, or produce decisive results in any other general 
mission contemplated under our policy are all visionary, as is the idea that a very large 
and independent air force is necessary to defend our country against attack.”34 
Baker’s rejection of strategic bombing stemmed from two separate views. The 
first is the adherence to the classical view of ground forces acting as the primary actor in 
military matters, which shunted air forces to tactical support roles. Any moves towards 
independence or the development of bombers ill suited to support roles would be 
rejected. The second was that of 1935 American isolationism and its intent on staying out 
of conflicts on the European continent. Thus, any weapons developed would have to be 
of a purely defensive character. Mitchell understood this when trying to sell aircrafts as 
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coast defenders. However, Baker rightly pointed out, that a large independent force is 
hardly necessary if the only purpose was coastal defense. It was this line of reasoning that 
compelled the Army General Staff at the same to time to strictly limit (other than the 
thirteen prototypes already built) the Air Corps’ production of the B-17, its cutting edge 
long range and high altitude bomber, and to be wary of any sort of advanced bomber 
development. After all, the bomber was “distinctly an airplane of aggression” incapable 
of fitting “in the armament of a nation which has a National Policy of good will and 
Military Policy of protection, not aggression.”35 
Writing as he did in 1935, it is hard to blame Baker for this perception of the Air 
Corps. On the one hand, the policies emerging from ACTS increasingly suggested that 
airplanes, attacking strategically, could single handedly end an armed conflict. On the 
other hand, a look at the actual strength of the Air Corps by 1936 showed a force of only 
946 planes on hand, not even accounting for the number of them that were actually 
serviceable or bordering on obsolete.36 It should come as no surprise, then, that Baker 
was skeptical of the Air Corps’ ability, or that, given his recommendations, a senior 
airman in 1939 would describe the Air Corps as a “fifth rate airforce.”37 
Still, on the eve of America’s entry into the war, some important changes had 
occurred to the Air Corps, most prominently the June 20th 1941 decision to restructure the 
Corps as the Army Air Force, with General Henry “Hap” Arnold serving as its Chief of 
Staff. It was still not the complete independence that the airmen had desired, because the 
Air Force remained subordinate to the Army – not coequal. But it offered Arnold his own 
dedicated air staff, a unity of command over all Army aircraft, and a tentative position on 
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the Joint Chiefs.38 The other major change was Roosevelt’s January 1939 allocation of 
some $300 million to bring the (then still) Air Corps up to 5,500 airplanes, which they 
hoped to amass by June 1941.39 
The nascent USAAF had thus barely been established and was still a jumble of 
poorly defined channels of command when, on July 9th 1941, Roosevelt asked the Army 
and Navy to prepare “an estimate of overall production requirements required to defeat 
our potential enemies.”40 On August 4th, the Army asked the AAF to prepare an Air 
Annex, and the responsibility fell upon Col. Harold George, onetime ACTS instructor 
and the new chief of the just-formed Air War Plans Division of the AAF, to produce the 
document, a mere seven days before it was due on August 12th. George would assemble a 
team of three other men – Lt. Col. Kenneth Walker, Major Larry Kuter, and Major 
Haywood “Possum” Hansell – all former instructors at ACTS, and future leaders of the 
AAF’s efforts in WWII.41 The document they produced, titled AWPD-1, would go far 
beyond what was requested of them and, by its addition into the War Department’s 
report, would become the first ‘official’ AAF doctrine. “The result,” as Hansell would 
write years later, “was a straightforward product of air doctrine produced at [ACTS],” 
one that would become the basis for the AAF’s wartime policy and the marker against 
which its conduct would be assessed for years to follow.42 In order to understand how the 
Air Force found itself firebombing Japanese cities less than five years later, we must first 
appreciate the multitude of factors which determined the dominant ACTS doctrine by the 
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mid 1930s, and the circumstances of the subsequent crystallization of the first official 
Army Air policy by dedicated ACTS instructors in 1941. 
 
Air Corps Tactical School 
The first ACTS report of consequence, at least as far as this discussion is 
concerned, was the manual Employment of Combined Air Forces, released in 1926. Using 
concepts derived from Douhet, this was the first Air Corps document to systematically 
reject the tactical role of airplanes in favor of a strategic attack on the enemy’s population 
centers and “vital points.”43 The definition of these “vital points” would prove to be a 
crucial undertaking both in the planning and execution of the war itself and different 
“target systems” would occupy higher priorities as situations and intelligence changed. 
On the purely theoretical basis of early ACTS publications, these vital centers were 
discrete targets such as power systems, transportation networks, and industrial factories, 
and were to be attacked using precision munitions. The demolition of these targets would 
serve two complementary objectives. The first was the actual destruction of the 
productive capacity of the enemy, and thus their ability to continue waging war. The 
second was to terrorize the population, through both the direct bombing of cities and the 
indirect withholding of necessary municipal services through the destruction of 
infrastructure, which would undermine the will to continue fighting.44 
The 1926 policy centered on attacking both vital centers and populations 
themselves, and this latter target brought the condemnation of the Army, Navy, and 
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Congress, a three-pronged attack the Air Corps was in no position to withstand, 
especially given the damage Mitchell had just done and the Corps’ continued need for 
financial and political support.45 Likewise, as much as the Air Corps bragged about the 
strategic capabilities of the airplane, they recognized that they were in no practical 
position to recommend a policy that required innumerable planes indiscriminately (and 
inaccurately) blanketing a city with munitions that they could ill afford to waste. Even by 
1941, when the Army Air Force was significantly better supported than the Air Corps of 
the early 30s, Generals Ira Eaker and Hap Arnold wrote that “bombers in far larger 
numbers than are available today will be required for wiping out people in sufficient 
numbers by aerial bombardment to break the will of a whole nation.”46 It was simply a 
question of efficiency – one that admittedly left open the possibility of this sort of “area” 
or “morale” bombing should the sufficient resources avail themselves. 
The new concept that developed in the place of bombing city centers was based 
on a theory of “bottleneck” or “choke points” in industry and infrastructure. These would 
be specific targets whose destruction would cause an avalanche effect and bring down 
increasingly large sectors of society and industry in its wake. As the core of the new 
precision strategic targets, the moment of inspiration for this realization has been highly 
mythologized in the histories. Some credit ACTS instructor Donald Wilson for the 
Eureka! Moment, when he realized in 1933 that entire railroads would be stopped by the 
lack of a single lubrication ingredient.47 Others attribute the idea to the simple recognition 
of the great strain that war and depression had placed on all economies, and that the 
destruction of the economy’s vital points would mean sure devastation for the entire 
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economy.48 Still others refer to a 1935 power failure in New York, and the thought that 
an attack on power stations with only eighteen bombers would bring an entire city to its 
knees. There is also the well citied example of a flood in a Pittsburgh spring 
manufacturing plant which caused a drop in production of controllable pitch propellers 
nationwide.49 
I go through these different attributions because the doctrine of precision strategic 
attacks became the watchword of American aerial doctrine in WWII. Subsequently, its 
invention has almost become the stuff of legend, established as the great moment of 
clarity in American war planning, and thus as sacrosanct. But a look at the variety of 
possible sources of inspiration for the plan shows on the one hand that all – or none – of 
them might have been true, but more importantly, that the choice to abandon area 
bombing in favor of precision strategic bombing was not a moment of divine inspiration, 
but rather was influenced by any number of specific forces prevalent in the late 1920s 
and 1930s, ones that were bound to change, transforming practice with it. 
Nonetheless, in line with the evolution of strategic bombing, the subsequent 
manuals in 1931 and 1934 saw ACTS doctrine slowly shy away from direct Douhetian 
attacks on civilians. In 1931 cities became “political objectives” not to be targeted 
without careful considerations of the collateral damage and public relations crisis that 
would ensue. The 1934 policy took a small step back, recognizing that attacking cities – 
especially western ones with high standards of living – offered an exceptional 
opportunity for undermining civilian morale.  While the public would likely find it 
                                                
48 Schaffer, 29. 
49 Werrell, 15; Sherry, 54. Indeed, this thinking would continue to dominate AAF thinking through the 
ETO. The infamous and extremely costly botched raid on Schweinfurt was aimed at destroying a crucial 
ball bearings plant there, without which, the German aircraft industry would have come to an absolute 
standstill.  
 INCENDIARY WARS  30 
distasteful, the Air Corps could not ignore the fact that all major powers were preparing 
similar war plans, and thus the option had to remain on the table. Nevertheless, they were 
convinced that “a more desirable and more effective approach is available” involving 
strikes on specific sites “upon which the social life of the nation depends,” such as 
transportation, power, or food stocks. In 1935 this view was streamlined, rejecting area 
bombing as inefficient and internationally abhorred, while noting that precision bombing 
could accomplish the same objectives of destroying the capability and will of the people 
more proficiently and humanely, by attacking the (now expanded) list of “transportation 
facilities and sources of energy and raw materials.” By 1939, ACTS lectures clearly laid 
out that “direct attack of the civil populace…is rejected…due to humanitarian 
considerations,” while the target list grew further to include petroleum and financial 
facilities.50 
As alluded to above, the adoption of the “vital points” concept ushered in the 
notion of precision strategic bombing, one that relied on the bomber’s ability to 
consistently place his munitions within a 100 foot by 100 foot target area – the estimated 
size of an average factory.51 The move towards this level of precision in the ACTS air 
theory had as much to do with political and public relations imperatives to avoid any 
intimation of targeting civilians as it did with the technological conditions that prevailed 
in the 1930s – especially towards the end of the decade.52 
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Most influential was the 1923 development of the first gyroscope stabilized 
bombsight by the Norden Company. Until the development of the Norden bombsights, 
bombardiers had to “aim” their bombs optically, but the increasing speeds and altitudes 
of modern bombers made it near impossible to accurately place the munitions. By the late 
1930s Norden had developed the Mark XI bombsight, which employed an automatic 
tachometer (speed sensor) and a gyroscope attached to a rudimentary computer. The 
bomber would align the target with the crosshairs of his viewing telescope, and the 
bombsight would take over the autopilot of the aircraft, correct for the pitch and yaw, 
maintain airspeed and altitude, and calculate the proper trajectory of the bomb. This was 
the technology that the USAAF and Navy entered the war with in 1941. It was considered 
such proprietary knowledge that it was classified as Secret, and downed pilots were 
instructed to put “two rounds with a .45 caliber service pistol” through the unit rather 
than have it captured.53 
Tactical School instructors hoped to capitalize on this technical advantage, and 
enshrined precision bombing – a capability at that time only possible with the Norden, 
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and only in the daytime when targets were visible – as the cornerstone of their aerial 
bombing policy. Testing this new gadget through the 1930s from altitudes of 4,000-
11,000 feet, the Air Corps became confident that they could drop bombs “into a pickle 
barrel,” and increasingly modeled their air strategy based on that conviction. Of course, 
almost no tests were done above the 16,000-foot ceiling that saw most of the bombing in 
Germany, let alone the 30,000-foot altitude achieved by the B-29 in Japan. Nor did the 
test-bombers have to deal with the adverse weather or anti-aircraft flak that would define 
wartime experience. Needless to say, even with the Norden, if clouds obscured the target, 
there was no way to accurately target it. The daytime precision bombing doctrine, then, 
was premised upon a perceived technological superiority that did not pan out as well as 
planners had hoped.54 
LeMay recalls a telling interaction between himself and the derisively named 
“Great Minds at Wright [air force base],” the AAF training and testing ground.  An 
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experimental “mercury-vapor bombsight” had been created whose gyroscope locked-in 
its settings based on stabilization earlier in flight, thus freeing aircraft of the dangerous 
need to fly in “straight-and-level” over a well-defended target. The downside was that it 
was inherently less accurate, because the calibration was based on earlier flight 
conditions. “The eventual verdict” at Wright was “that – out there – that you could bomb 
much more effectively with the regular Norden bombsight.” LeMay tried to explain that 
in combat conditions “you’re not flying straight-and-level every second. Your speed is 
jumping up and down…and sometime demanded changes in position. Thus the so called 
experimental…sight gave us infinitely better results.” To which the response was “you 
don’t know what you’re talking about. The thing is not as accurate as the one we are 
giving you now [i.e. the Norden].”55  Inevitably, the airmen actually executing the war 
would need to adapt to the conditions as they experienced them, not as the ACTS 
instructors or other armchair warriors imagined them. 
The requirement to bomb during the day (so that the Norden could provide its 
tactical advantage) placed the airplanes at greater risk for interception by enemy fighters 
and flak. One possible response was to simply create a plane that could fly higher, faster, 
and further than any pursuit plane, thus putting it out of range of both flak and fighters. 
This would be the inspiration for the “Very Heavy Bomber,” what would eventually 
become the B-29, which first flew a decade later, in late September 1941. But in the 
1930s this was still a long way off and so technically advanced so as to make it 
unimaginable (after all, they had barely just created the B-17, though it too was 
incredibly advanced for its time and offered a very high cruising altitude). Similarly 
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difficult to conceive of was sending along a fighter escort to protect the bombers, because 
no fighter in existence had anywhere near the range of a bomber, and it was thought to be 
impossible to develop one. A bomber on a daylight mission, then, would need to be 
heavily armored to withstand flak hits and a self-defending craft able to engage with 
enemy fighters on its own (or, more correctly, in combat formation).56 
Thus emerged the (later, much maligned) policy of the unescorted bomber and the 
claim – out of practical necessity, not inherent strategy – that “the bombers always get 
through.”57  It was not a claim as much as an imperative, as a 1924-25 ACTS bombing 
text explained, “regardless of the opposition by the enemy…[the bombing crew] must 
find a way to reach their objective…no matter how numerous of how powerful [the 
defenses] may be, they will not prevent the bombardment from accomplishing its 
assigned missions…. Bombardment will reach and destroy its objective [italics mine].”58 
Until the 1930s, this view was upheld with the clear understanding that, “bombers 
opposed by enemy fighters would have to be supported by pursuit escort.”59 However, 
with the major advances in technology leading to the B-9 and B-10 high-speed bombers, 
as well as the promising results of early B-17 testing – with no comparable work being 
done on pursuit or fighter aircraft – the consensus emerged that U.S. pursuit aircraft could 
no longer keep up with their modern bombers. The hope would become that neither 
would enemy fighters.60 
                                                
56 Werrell, 16-17; Tillman, Whirlwind, 18. (In contrast to Sherry, Tillman recognizes that the 
“technological tail wagged the doctrinal dog”). 
57 James C. Gaston, Planning the American Air War: Four Men and Nine Days in 1941: An Inside 
Narrative (Fort Lesley J. McNair, Washington, D.C.: National Defense UP, 1982), 78. 
58 Quoted in Werrell, 12. 
59 Thomas H. Greer, The Development of Air Doctrine in the Army Air Arm, 1917-1941 (Washington, D.C.: 
Office of Air Force History. 1985), 58. 
60 Already by the 1930s, this hope should have been squashed by events in the Sino-Japanese war 
(beginning in 1931), The Spanish Civil War (beginning in 1936), and eventually the Battle of Britain in 
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The development of the precision strategic doctrine from practical and conditional 
needs, however, would pit the actual planners of war in 1941 and on against another 
practical concern. Even Douhet, when discussing attacks on cities, recognized that the 
destruction of certain targets is more effective than others. “The selection of objectives,” 
he said, “the grouping of zones and determining the order in which they are to be 
destroyed is the most delicate task in aerial warfare [italics mine].”61 The ACTS 
instructors stumbled upon the idea of precision attacks, and using local examples (New 
York power, Pittsburgh spring manufacturing, railroad lubricants…) speculated about 
which “vital centers” would be most vulnerable in Germany, and later Japan. However, 
post-war studies found that although military intelligence had some data, very little was 
actually understood about the German economy and absolutely nothing was known about 
Japan – which had been particularly careful to keep a cloak of secrecy over its industrial 
growth.62 Hansell would sum up the process in a lecture after the war. Target selection, 
                                                                                                                                            
1940 (Tillman, 17-18). While there is some evidence that the “bomber always gets through” policy was a 
theory adopted from Douhet, the Air Corps’ dogged adherence to the claim, even in the face of extremely 
persuasive empirical evidence, is compelling support for a more practical understanding of the pursuit 
aircraft question. This is further reinforced by the fact that the inadequacy of the self-defending bomber 
was soon recognized, but was addressed by simply adding better armor and more defensive guns, again 
because no pursuit aircraft were available, and the only other alternative – to attack at night – would 
undermine the crucial precision doctrine (Greer, 117). The notion that the bomber could defend itself is 
made all the more absurd when considering that Haywood Hansell, a chief ACTS theorist and adherent to 
precision bombing, admits that at the time of the policy’s inception, “we had no power turrets, no .50-cal. 
defensive guns, no accurate gunners” (Ibid., 60). That is, no feasible way to actually allow the planes to 
defend themselves.  
Still, it is hard to blame the planners for their conclusions. Left with little alternative, they relied 
on the fact that, theoretically speaking, the bomber was a more advanced aircraft and, if properly outfitted 
and arranged, could overcome fighter opposition. They had no way of knowing in 1935 that radar would 
advance by such leaps and bounds in the next decade, making incoming bombers more easily identified, 
anticipated, and thus more reliably intercepted. In a truly remarkable statement made years later, Hansell 
contends that “If our air theorists had had knowledge of radar in 1935, the American doctrine of strategic 
bombing in deep daylight penetrations would surely not have evolved” (Ibid.). 
61 Quoted in James Trapier Lowe, A Philosophy of Air Power (Lanham, MD: University of America, 1984), 
98. 
62 Crane, 20; Sherry, 55-56; Gaston, 32-33.  
For example, in 1940, General Arnold created the Strategic Air Intelligence Office, and placed 
Hansell in charge of intelligence about economic-industrial systems – exactly the information crucial for 
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he explained, “was essentially a problem for industrial economists, but no economists 
were available and no money was available to hire them, in view of the War 
Department’s attitude toward [strategic targeting]. So the School did the best it could.”63 
Later in the war, the actual task of discovering and ranking these targets would fall upon 
Operations Research groups loosely tied to the military, ones brought in to objectively 
assess the worth of each “target system” (i.e. aircraft production, power, transportation, 
etc…), leading to conclusions strikingly different than the theories of pre-war planners. 
That is, when actual efficiency was calculated using real data and accounting for tangible 
constraints, rather than speculation based on the prevailing circumstances of the late 
1930s, Air Force actions would change radically. 
 
AWPD-1 
On August 4th, 1941, Col. George and his team embarked on the seemingly 
impossible task of estimating in seven days the production requirements the Air Force 
                                                                                                                                            
properly selecting industrial “choke-points.” Hansell knew a lot of information about German industry, and 
when writing AWPD-1 in 1941, he came to the conclusion that the German economy was “under heavy 
strain” from wartime production, which would thus make it easier to seriously interrupt production by 
focusing on the most stressed targets. But the U.S. Strategic Bomber Survey, which reviewed the war effort 
after German surrender, came to a very different conclusion. It found that only 49 percent of Germany’s 
GNP was being dedicated to the war as of 1941, a number that would be easily increased to 64 percent in 
1944. Thus, the economy was nowhere near its capacity at the time, which fundamentally alters the target 
priorities. 
Against Japan this deficiency would be even more amplified. Not until October 13, 1944 did the 
USAAF get a photoreconnaissance flight over Japan. That is, until October of 1944 – after the XX Bomber 
Command had been attacking Japanese territories from China and the XXI Bomber Command was already 
established in the Marianas and was supposed to be attacking precision targets on the Japanese mainland – 
the USAAF had almost no idea what the actual distribution of Japanese industry and manufacturing looked 
like! The pictures that the Tokyo Rose took that day were turned into the Command’s targets (LeMay, 
Superfortress, 99-100). Before then, I am honestly unsure of how targets were chosen and evaluated with 
any sense of accuracy. It would seem, rather, that in the absence of concrete targets, Hansell and the leaders 
of the USAAF attacks against Japan fell back upon Douhet and Mitchell’s logic of bombing simply to sow 
chaos and destruction, display American air superiority, and undermine civilian morale (albeit while 
sticking to precision bombing techniques). Looked at it this way, very little changed when LeMay took 
over in January.  
63 Greer, 80-81. 
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needed to defeat its “potential enemies.” Compounding the difficulty was the 
understanding that it was impossible to come to a conclusion on force numbers without 
knowing what they would be needed for, i.e. without establishing a strategic policy for 
the U.S. war effort. In 1941, regardless of the myriad statements emerging from ACTS 
over the previous decade, the War Department conceptualized the Air Force largely in 
tactical terms – in support of Army and Navy ground operations. The production 
requirements to soften resistance pockets or clear out an artillery position before a ground 
assault were vastly different – both in numbers and in aircraft type – from those of 
strategic bombing. So in just seven days, George, Kuter, Walker, and Hansell would need 
to establish an official strategy of the just-formed USAAF, which until that point had 
been defined by documents emerging from the unofficial Tactical School statements, 
make sure it was in line with ABC-164 and RAINBOW no. 565, and come to a conclusion 
on force requirements, all while trying to adhere to their own well-entrenched 
understanding of the best way to employ the aircraft.66 It is not surprising, then, that they 
simply applied the accumulated knowledge of ACTS doctrine, with all its 
shortsightedness and practical limitations. 
What emerged by August 12th was likely not at all what the War Department had 
in mind. It adhered to the “Germany First” policy and did not mention requirements 
versus a potential attack against Japan. But the fundamental outlook of AWPD-1 was the 
                                                
64 ABC-1 was an early 1941 U.S. Staff Committee and British Chiefs of Staff agreement stipulating that, 
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targets, all in preparation for an eventual invasion of the continent. Only after Germany’s surrender would 
the war move to the Pacific, where again invasion would be the official operating thesis, though by then the 
Air Force had other plans.   
65 Basic War Plan RAINBOW no. 5 was a Joint Army-Navy war plan that conformed with the 
understanding reached with the British in the ABC-1 agreement.  
66 Greer, 123-24; Hansell, 5-6. 
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ability of air assault to compel surrender on its own. George and his team figured that 
strategic attacks would serve to weaken the enemy nation in preparation for a ground 
assault regardless, and in order to placate the Army, they “appended a provision for 
[tactical] support of an invasion if necessary.” Instead of focusing on military targets, 
AWPD-1 focused on the destruction of four systems. The overriding objective was the 
“neutralization of the German fighter force” – both its planes and the factories producing 
them. The control of the skies that would follow would allow unimpeded access to the 
other three objectives: power, transportation, and oil and petroleum systems. Interestingly 
enough, the plan stipulated that should German morale be on the brink of collapse, it 
might be useful to employ area bombing tactics and attack cities, to strike a fatal blow to 
enemy resistance (a long known war theory called Todestoss [lit. deathblow]67).68 
Amazingly enough, General Marshall, Secretary Stimson, and the Joint Army-
Navy Board accepted AWPD-1 – a plan that was in significant contradiction to official 
American war plans. Even more shocking were the production requirements they appear 
to have accepted. Upon final calculation of bombing accuracy, payload, and target 
characteristics, AWPD-1 called for almost 62,000 aircraft to be manned by just fewer 
than 180,000 officers and 2 million enlisted men.69 At that point in 1941, the AAF had 
not even reached its authorized limit of 152,000 men, and the entire Army itself was 
made up of just over 1.5 million men!70 Whether this plan was accepted because the war 
leaders were pressed for time (AWPD-1 was submitted at the very last moment), because 
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they did not pay much attention to its content71, or because the Army was beginning to 
have a change of heart regarding the role of aviation, the fact remained that USAAF 
strategic bombing was now firmly established as official policy. One year later, on 
September 9th, 1942, AWPD-42 was assembled, this time not as a plan against potential 
enemies, but because the U.S. had entered the war, it was an accounting of actual 
requirements. It differed little from AWPD-1 in strategy, other than including a short 
section on Japan, listing eight target systems that might prove beneficial to attack. Still, it 
was too early and far too little was known about Japan to prepare real estimates.72 
 
* * * 
 
On the surface, then, the evolution of ACTS doctrine and (for the most part) its 
official sanction as AWPD-1 appears to be a clear repudiation of targeting or 
intentionally terrorizing enemy civilians and a rejection of Douhet and Mitchell’s 
contentions that the air war obviated the distinction between combatants and non-
combatants. But both Schaffer and Sherry point out that, when analyzed carefully, not 
much had changed from the “prophet’s” understandings of the end game of war. True, the 
tactics themselves has been altered significantly – civilian casualties were to be avoided, 
precision doctrine and all that it entailed was adopted – but these changes appear to have 
                                                
71 Upon submitting the full report, the Joint Board remarked that “Air Forces…can render valuable 
assistance, but it can be accepted as an almost invariable rule that only armies can win wars” (quoted in 
Hansell, 6). 
72 Particularly absent from both AWPD-1 and -42 was any mention of the need for pursuit aircraft. This 
again reinforces the practical limitations constricting the air planners. In creating AWPD-1 it was a mix of 
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Schwelnfurt on October 14th, 1943, a raid led by LeMay (which would inform his decisions in March of 
1945) in which 60 unescorted Fortresses were lost, 17 suffered major damage, and 121 others were hit by 
German ground and air defenses (Greer, 126). 
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simply been a different response to the same question: How can we best end the enemy’s 
ability to wage war? Douhet thought it was to totally decimate the city, while Mitchell 
was convinced that a few gas bombs would suffice. With the development of precision 
techniques and a keener appreciation of the Air Corps’ limited resources, the Tactical 
School felt that “vital centers” and choke points would be the most efficient way to 
achieve their objective. Ultimately, whether the attack was directed at the civilians 
themselves or at the utilities that served them, the goal remained to make life unlivable 
for the enemy’s population – both in fact and in psyche. Put another way, “Americans 
planned to use airpower independently to destroy strategic targets (industrial 
infrastructure), and the ultimate goal of this strategy was to bring about a collapse in 
enemy morale, defined as civilian morale.”73 That civilians themselves would not be the 
target did not change the fact that, to a great extent, their morale still was. 
The true test of what defined the new policy would be whether the end goal was 
the morale of the population or its ability to make war. Crucially, this distinction was 
never fully appreciated by the ACTS theorists. In 1939, Muir Fairchild, an influential 
ACTS instructor, echoed Mitchell when he claimed that 
The industrial mechanisms which provide the means of war to the armed forces, and those that 
provide the means of sustaining a normal life to the civil population, are not separate, 
disconnected entities…. If not electrical power, then the destruction of some other common 
element will render them both inoperative at a single blow. The nationwide reaction to the 
stunning discovery that the sources of the country’s power to resist and sustain itself, are being 
relentlessly destroyed, can hardly fail to be decisive.74 
 
The fact that both will and ability could be destroyed at once begs the question, because 
the time would come when this would no longer be the case, or at least the claim would 
be more tenuous. At that time, a decision would need to be made as to what was more 
                                                
73 Alexander B. Downes, “Military Culture and Civilian Victimization: The Case of American Strategic 
Bombing in World War II,” 17. 
74 Sherry, 55. 
 INCENDIARY WARS  41 
important: the steel factory itself, or the impression among its workers of whether or not 
it was safe to leave their homes. Contrary to that which is said about the clarity of 
American precision doctrine, this question cannot be answered by appealing to official 
policy, and it would be this dilemma which faced LeMay as he took over the XXI 
Bomber Command in January of 1945, and more markedly in late April of that year. 
“Area bombing” was abandoned primarily for practical reasons of efficiency and 
the availability of technology which compelled the adoption of precision methods, though 
humanitarian concerns made it more attractive. As General Hansell, a leading proponent 
of precision bombing expressed, “the idea of killing thousands of men, women, and 
children was basically in contrast to American mores.” However, he was sure to add that 
“from a pragmatic view, people did not make good targets for the high explosive bomb, 
the principle weapon of the offense.”75 But what would happen when new munitions, 
which were more effective against individuals and their homes, were introduced and 
began to occupy a central role in AAF tactics? It seems apparent that while the 
humanitarian limitation on collateral damage was an appealing and admirable aspiration, 
it played second fiddle to the technical limitations facing the airmen. Already discussed is 
General Arnold’s 1941 contention that too many bombers were needed to effectively 
destroy a city. The inverse is implicit, that should the requisite strength be available, there 
would be no moral apprehension among the leading airmen to attacking cities – though 
the public might need to be shielded from the truth.  
By 1945 in Japan, LeMay had hundreds of B-29s under his command – a plane 
whose capabilities were just barely being imagined in 1941 – with more coming by the 
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day. After months of failed raids on the mainland, the notion that precision bombing was 
more efficient than anything came under serious debate. At that point, the only obstacle 
separating the XXI Bomber Command and all-out attacks on civilian centers – an option 
made much more attractive by the recently acquired M-69 incendiary bomb – was a 
legacy of USAAF policy and its apparent concern for human life. However, when briefly 
held up to scrutiny, this concern buckled under its inherent indecisiveness regarding the 
objective of aerial attacks. 76 
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Part II: Early Operations Against Japan 
The Twentieth Air Force 
The Twentieth Air Force, established April 4th 1944 to oversee the B-29 combat 
groups in the Pacific Theater, was not your regular AAF command, simply following the 
Nineteenth Air Force in the date of its incorporation. In fact, there was no Nineteenth Air 
Force, or Eighteenth, or even Sixteenth. The Twentieth Air Force was to be General 
Arnold’s own command, answering directly to his office in Washington. So to distinguish 
it from the other “numbered air forces,” Arnold chose to jump it up to the Twentieth.77 
But it was not just for vanity. The projected air campaign against Japan would be unlike 
any ever waged before, with an airplane whose capabilities were a pipedream only years 
earlier, and Arnold was intent on learning from organizational mistakes made over the 
two years of air combat in Germany.78 The Twentieth would be qualitatively different. 
After Roosevelt’s 1939 volte-face on airplane research and development, General 
Arnold took it upon himself to bring the Air Corps up to speed with its potential enemies. 
He immediately contracted Consolidated Aircraft to produce what would become the B-
24 Liberator, the sister of the B-17 in the European theater and assigned a committee to 
determine the specifics of a plane that would exceed even the modern B-17 and B-24: the 
“super strategic,” “Very Long Ranger (VLR)” or “Very Heavy Bomber (VHB).” The 
specifics of this revolutionary aircraft will be discussed later in conjunction with the 
technical aspects of the incendiary bombing of Japan; for our purposes now, the origins 
of the plane will suffice. By May of 1940, the over 141-foot wingspan Boeing Model 345 
had been presented to the Air Corps and it promised nearly 5,5000 miles in range and 
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three times the bomb load of a B-17. Just under four months later, the Air Corps put 
down $3.6 million for two Model 345s, designating them the XB-29. A full-scale mock-
up was tested in a wind tunnel in April of 1941, and the next month, the Air Corps – 
before even seeing it in the air - placed an order for 250 production B-29 aircraft. The 
first combat-ready B-29 would fly to the Pacific on March 26th, 1944 – fewer than four 
years after the initial blueprint was presented to the Air Corps. Desperate times called for 
desperate measures, and with the Luftwaffe wreaking havoc on British cities in 1941, 
there was the palpable sense within the United States Military that aerial attacks against 
the German mainland might need to be launched from the Western Hemisphere.79 
Thus began Arnold’s “three-billion-dollar-gamble,” surely the most unorthodox 
procurement process the military had ever known – or likely has known since. By the 
time the first prototype B-29 took flight in September 1941, 1,664 planes had been 
ordered, with more to follow.80 Given that Arnold staked his reputation on this plane’s 
success, it is no wonder that he fought to bring it under his control in what would become 
the Twentieth AF. But there were practical reasons as well, and it was these that would 
win over the Join Chiefs of Staff. 
The Pacific command structure was unlike that of the European Theater. In 
Europe, the U.S.-British Combined Chiefs of Staff (CCS) shared operational control, and 
established a Supreme Commander over the entire theater. The ABC-1agreement had 
stipulated that, below the supreme commander, “all U.S. forces were to be under the 
immediate control of the commanding general of the U.S. Army Forces in Great Britain 
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(or British Isles-USAFBI).”81 Thus, the Eighth Air Force – the American’s primary 
strategic air unit in Europe – was assigned under the ultimate command of the Theater’s 
Army commander. The arrangement under the CCS led to two outcomes – one favorable 
and one unfavorable – that would shape Arnold’s thinking when establishing the 
Twentieth AF. 
On the plus side, Britain’s Royal Air Force was co-equal with their Navy and 
Army (as of 1917, in response to General Jan Christiaan Smuts’ recommendation)82, and 
thus a real member of the CCS. The Joint Chiefs, particularly Chief of Staff of the Army 
General George Marshall, felt that General Arnold should be included in the CCS as the 
corollary to the RAF. Thus arose a unique opportunity for Arnold in his quest for Air 
Force independence: 
“Within the War Department, Arnold was subject to Marshall as Chief of Staff, and…the stubborn 
facts of seniority and rank: Arnold had only received his third star with the advent of war and was 
not to be made a four-star general for another year. Within the CCS and JCS there was no 
hierarchy and legally, at least, the Commanding General of the Army Air Forces, the Army Chief 
of Staff, and the Chief of Naval Operations shared equal responsibilities and powers.”83 
 
As a result, “in most important respects the AAF enjoyed tacitly a quasi-equality with the 
Army and Navy rather than the parity with the [Army Ground Forces] and [Army Service 
Forces] which was it legal status.”84 Arnold would further build upon this “quasi-
equality” with the institution of the Twentieth AF. 
However, the setup also had a downside, one that undermined the very path to 
independence that Arnold advocated. The subordination of the actual fighting units to the 
Army theater commanders meant that the aircraft would be used primarily as tactical 
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support for ground operations, rather than in the strategic role for which they were 
envisioned and established. Rather than displaying the AAF’s unique ability to influence 
the war’s outcome, the Air Force would be implicated in reinforcing the dominance of 
ground forces. This is exactly what happened, as the Eighth AF was tied up in the 
summer of 1942 in support of OPERATION TORCH (the invasion of North Africa), and 
again would be diverted by the CCS OPERATION POINTBLANK, promising air support 
in preparation for the Normandy invasion (OVERLORD), starting from February 1944. 
U.S. air leaders would vigorously oppose this diversion and argue for the necessity of 
continuing strategic attacks, but to no avail.85 The Air Force in Europe never succeeded 
in delivering a mortal blow to the Germans, and as we see from the response to 
POINTBLANK, it to some extent was implicitly blamed on the command structure which 
limited the AAF’s latitude to employ strategic bombing to its fullest. This was the second 
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Hastings argues, correctly, it seems, that POINTBLANK was actually a very positive result for the 
AAF. Especially its inclusion of the newly-delivered P-51 Mustang, a long-range pursuit plane decisively 
shown to be necessary after the repeated devastating USAAF losses sustained trying to destroy the ball-
bearing plants at Schweinfurt. 
Though it was largely a tactical mission, as the first major operation involving USAAF planes and 
tactics, TORCH offers us (just like it offered Air Force leaders in 1943) an initial critical view of the 
workings of ACTS doctrine in actual combat situations. As mentioned in chapter one, tactical aviation had 
largely been shunned in ACTS in favor of strategic doctrine, but it still had influential supporters and 
adherents (foremost was then-Colonel – later Major General – Claire Chennault, who would resign from 
the Air Corps to become Chiang Kai-Shek’s air advisor and commander of the “Flying Tigers,” only to be 
incorporated into the USAAF in 1942 as the Fourteenth AF [Charles F. Romanus and Riley Sunderland, 
United States Army in World War II, China-Burma-India Theater: Stilwell's Mission to China 
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taught the theory to pursuit aviators at ACTS. An interesting essay “A Question of Success: Tactical Air 
Doctrine and Practice in North Africa, 1942-43” by B. Michael Bechthold (The Journal of Military History 
68.3 (2004): 821-51), analyses the growing pains of the Eighth AF as it struggled to adapt its tactical theory 
to combat situations in the early months of TORCH. Though largely the fault of a refusal by the Army 
commanders to relinquish absolute control of the tactical aircraft, Bechthold concludes that “American 
theory prior to the campaign…was found lacking in an number of areas when exposed to the crucible of 
battle” (850). Though the theories themselves were largely sound, their application was found wanting 
when the pristine conditions of ACTS training sessions were replaced by the travails of battle. And while 
almost no aspect of tactical doctrine was similar to precision doctrine, the same chasm between the 
theoretical assumptions and the hard realities of war would necessitate an ad-hoc reevaluation of precision 
policy and restructuring of precision practice, just as it did for tactical aviation during the TORCH campaign 
in Northern Africa. 
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impetus animating Arnold in his quest to establish the Twentieth Air Force. And he was 
helped along the way by the peculiar circumstances of the Pacific theater. 
Contrary to the growing feeling within the Air Force, the prevailing wisdom 
within the Army was still that final victory over Japan would come only through an 
invasion of the Kyushu and Honshu islands. Still, a Navy defensive posture by sea would 
occupy the first few years of the battle until the Army could be freed from the Germany 
offensive (per ABC-1 agreement). Naval leaders, then, believed that they should be 
afforded the supreme command of the Pacific Theater because they would be there first 
(and thought they would be able to compel surrender by blockade, a notion at least 
somewhat borne-out by the United States Strategic Bombing Survey (USSBS) post-war 
analysis86). Army leaders, on the other hand, felt that since they would be leading the 
ultimate ground invasion, as well as operations in Japanese-controlled China, that they 
should receive the command. Faced with this rivalry, Roosevelt and the Joint Chiefs 
chose in March 1942 to accede to both. The Army was given command of the South 
West Pacific Area (SWPA), led by General Douglas MacArthur and the Navy received 
the Pacific Ocean Area, under the leadership of Admiral Chester Nimitz.87 
Thus, as the B-29s began to trickle out to India for their participation in 
OPERATION MATTERHORN (more on this in a moment), a complex plan that involved 
shuttling B-29s from their bases in India, over the Himalayas, to forward stations in 
China from where they were to attack Japanese targets in China and Kyushu (the 
southernmost island on the Japanese archipelago), the problems of the distinct Pacific 
commands came to the fore. This was exacerbated by a third command, the Southeast 
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Asia Command, this one not even residing in the American military, but with the British 
Admiral Lord Luis Mountbatten as Supreme Allied Commander. His American deputy 
was General Joseph Stillwell, commander of the China-Burma-India (CBI) Theater, who 
oversaw all U.S. forces in India, including the proposed B-29 bases in Calcutta. With B-
29 bases also to be placed on the soon-to-be captured Mariana Islands, the B-29s were 
poised to be based in, operate out of, or attack locations in all three commands in the 
Pacific. 
Traditional Army rules prized the unity of command, which placed all the 
resources of a specified geographical area under the control of the theater or area 
commander. This would pose two significant problems for Arnold, the AAF, and his 
hopes for the B-29. First of all, the B-29 was created specifically for its super-long range, 
the assumption being that it would be able to fly across and above command areas to 
attack far-flung targets. The importance for the Air Force was “unity at the target area” 
and it was irrelevant where the planes came from.88 Indeed, it was often ideal that aircraft 
from divergent theaters converge at the same time over a target, which would spread thin 
the air defenses. Timing would be crucial and coordinating take-off times between 
remote commands would be complicated. It was also unclear how an area commander 
would be able to control a resource meant to operate outside of his command zone. Along 
those lines, it would be natural for theater commanders to want to employ B-29s in 
support of their actions in their areas, thus diverting the B-29 to a tactical role. This was 
unthinkable to Arnold, and attempts to avoid the co-option of the B-29 would continue to 
animate USAAF actions throughout the war. 
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With no hope for a more orderly organization (Arnold would quip that he “could 
find no one out there who wanted unity of command, seemingly, unless he himself was 
made Supreme Commander”), it became apparent that another command would be 
necessary.89 It took some convincing, but eventually the Joint Chiefs accepted the merit 
of the above arguments, and in their 155th meeting, agreed in principle to the creation of 
the Twentieth Air Force. The language of the agreement highlights an important shift in 
Army thinking solidified by the creation of the Twentieth. The new “strategic Army Air 
Force” would be “created to operate directly under the Joint Chiefs of Staff” and 
“commanded by the Commanding General, Army Air Forces, who will act as the 
executive agent” of the JCS [italics mine].90 While still believing that invasion would be 
necessary, the experience in Germany convinced the Army that the Air Force bombers 
were more useful in a strategic – rather than tactical – role. 
Still, unlike the Navy (which also unifies command under their top-echelon of 
officers, not mid-level area commanders), the AAF was based on land and so logistical 
support as well as “the provision of suitable bases…and the provision for their defense, 
[would] be the responsibility of the theater or area commander.”91 Local commanders 
would thus put in a tough spot. They had to provide for and defend the B-29s, taking 
much-needed resources away from their own crews, but were not furnished with control 
of the airplane and would not receive any credit for its success. The agreement sought to 
limit this tension with the proviso that “should a strategic or tactical emergency” arise in 
the theater, the commander could “at their discretion, utilize the VLR bomber for 
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purposes other than their primary mission.”92 This would be employed, for example, for 
the invasions of Iwo Jima and Okinawa, but bitterly contested by the AAF commanders 
every step of the way.93 
Nonetheless, the ultimate commander was to be General Arnold, and in light of 
his intimate connection with the development of the B-29, his legacy as USAAF leader 
rested squarely on the shoulders of this plane and the Twentieth AF’s successes. This 
would lead to a complicated scenario in which Arnold on the one hand tried to be very 
involved in the day-to-day activities of the Bomber Commands, yet on the other hand 
was constrained by a failing health (Arnold had at least four heart attacks, one of which 
Arnold’s biographer has directly attributed to the pressures of the war) and the nearly 
8,000 mile distance separating the Twentieth AF’s Washington HQ and the XXI Guam 
base.94 Moreover, it was abundantly clear to Arnold and to the Joint Chiefs that this 
experiment was a test case for Air Force independence, and so aside from simply helping 
the war effort, it became critical that the success of the B-29 program be entirely that of 
the USAAF and in line with its agenda. Tactical support – especially to the Navy, its 
prime inter-service rival, which longed to get control of the lucrative B-29 program – was 
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to be avoided at all costs. Victory needed to come from an awesome display of technical 
achievement, force, and destruction. And it needed to happen before the November 1945 
timeframe set for the Army invasion of Kyushu.95 
 
MATTERHORN 
Arnold’s sense of urgency, along with Roosevelt’s political desire to support 
Generalissimo Chiang Kai-Shek led to the ill-fated OPERATION MATTERHORN. The 
Calcutta-to-Chengtu campaign was intended to allow for strikes on Japanese targets in 
Manchuria, Korea, and the southern Japanese island of Kyushu by April of 1944, before 
the anticipated capture of the Mariana Islands (Guam, Saipan, and Tinian), which had 
been pushed forward to June 1944. The intentionally short time span given to 
MATTERHORN and the rush to establish the more permanent bases in the Marianas tells 
us everything we need to know about the viability of the program. 
It appears that much of the impetus for the move came from Roosevelt’s 
conviction that “the initiation of the bomber offensive, and even measures in the 
preparation therefore, [would] tremendously stimulate Chinese morale and unify the 
Chinese people under the leadership of Chiang Kai-Shek.”96 Roosevelt’s hedge of “even 
measures in the preparation” for the attack shows the extent to which he realized that this 
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was a foolish use of resources, and unlikely to amount to much in terms of bombing 
results. The rationale for attacks out of Chengtu was based largely on a November 1944 
report on strategic targets in Japan by the Committee of Operations Analysis (COA) – a 
group formed by General Arnold in December 1942 to study and decide upon bombing 
targets that fulfilled the AAF’s notions of strategic “vital centers.”97 The report identified 
six strategic targets – one of which was the steel industry – easily crippled by the 
destruction of coke ovens, which were highly concentrated in locations within the range 
of a B-29 in Chengtu. The appeal of cutting off the steel supply was that it was one of 
these theoretical “choke points” from ACTS doctrine, one that would immobilize the rest 
of industrial production that depended on steel as raw material. 
Using Roosevelt’s political desire to support the Generalissimo, Arnold pushed 
for the immediate deployment of the XX Bomber Command to India, intent on showing 
off his beloved plane’s capabilities and legitimizing its expense and the new command 
built around it. To lead the group, Arnold tapped General Kenneth Wolfe, the man who 
had guided the B-29 program through development to production, and who was seen as a 
brilliant engineer, but not a particularly innovative commander.98 His choice reflected the 
state of the B-29 as it entered service. Roosevelt had promised Chiang Kai-Shek that if 
the Generalissimo could get runways built (and he did –with half a million laborers 
crushing rock and laying 6-foot thick runways by hand),99 the planes would arrive in mid 
April. And yet by March, no planes were ready for combat. What followed in the next 
five weeks has been called “the Battle of Kansas” (the locations of the B-29 plants) 
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during which the B-29 program was put into hyper-speed, and succeeded in getting the 
planes out in time.100 The downside was that the new plane, already rushed through 
development, would need even more flight-line maintenance and modification. Fifty-four 
major modifications were made to every B-29 produced in 1944, and over the course of 
the war, more than 1,000 modifications would be considered, two thirds of which were 
acted upon.101 Wolfe would be the perfect man for “shaking down the plane” – to see 
those changes through on the tarmac.102 
But the B-29 would not be the only obstacle facing the XX BC. Even before the 
first planes left Kansas for Calcutta, the nearly unanimous rejoinder of the Joint War 
Planning Committee (JWPC) and Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC) – the two planning 
staffs of the Joint Chiefs – was that MATTERHORN was foolish and inefficient. The 
COA targets themselves were worthwhile, but the job of the COA was to analyze the 
value of economic (strategic) target in a vacuum – without regard for the tactical or 
military problems involved: bases, alternative requirements for resources, etc. When the 
planning staffs reviewed MATTERHORN in light of the operation limitations that existed 
in early 1944, they found that shipping was the most pressing target, and that the long-
term results of attacking the steel industry could not be substantiated so early in the 
Pacific conflict. As for the actual merits of base selection – which the COA did not 
investigate – they found Chengtu to be the absolute worst. However, the president and 
Joint Chiefs had already agreed to the plan and promised Chiang Kai-Shek the support. 
Thus, the JWPC’s final report acceded to the plan, while warning “that the 
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implementation of MATTERHORN first is not in consonance with conclusions reached 
from the detailed studies.”103 
Indeed, it had been a political move, and the planning staff’s concerns would 
prove prophetic. Still, it is impossible to remove politics from even the inter-military 
disagreement regarding the merits of MATTERHORN. The JWPC was an ‘establishment’ 
group, and its rejection of the plan in favor of a campaign out of Australia aimed at 
shipping and petroleum was indicative of the Navy point of view. It would have 
facilitated both the Army and Navy’s war plans for the Pacific, while prejudicing the 
AAF’s view which recognized shipping “as a vitally important target, but not as a proper 
B-29 objective. The plane and its equipment had been designed for high-altitude 
bombardment.”104 Per the AAF’s doctrinal development process, wherein policy 
followed technique, any attempt to co-opt the B-29 for operations other than those it was 
designed for was tantamount to rejection of the strategic doctrine altogether, and with it 
the notion of the necessity of an independent Air Force. 
After the war, the USSBS found that “prior to the occupation of the Marianas, B-
29s could have been more effectively used in coordination with submarines for search, 
low-level attacks and mining in accelerating the destruction of Japanese shipping, or in 
destroying oil and metal plants in the southern areas, than in striking the Japanese "Inner 
Zone" from China bases.”105 That is, in almost any capacity other than the one decided 
upon! The primary reason for this inefficiency was the absurd system required to supply 
the forward Chengtu base. Cut off by from land or sea supply routes by Japanese 
blockade and primitive roads, the Americans had to fly all their supplies 1,200 miles from 
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Calcutta, over the dangerous Himalayas (“the Hump”), and to Chengtu – often using 
stripped-down B-29s as cargo planes. Fuel was only available in India, so every flight 
carrying fuel to supply the eventual air strike needed to use much of the fuel it carried 
over for its own return trip. From May to July 1944, an average of seven gallons of fuel 
were burned for every one delivered, allowing for little more than one mission a month. 
By July, after tweaking the system, the XX would reach its concept of self-sufficiency, 
with its own haul supporting the roughly 115 sorties engaged in. Still, this was half of the 
“weight of attack” anticipated by its planners. Clearly, MATTERHORN would have a very 
limited capability to effect any significant damage on Japan, especially in relation to the 
resources expended.106 
Wolfe’s first attack on June 5th 1944 was staged from India rather than China to 
give his team a good practice run without cutting into the vital fuel stocks which had been 
painstakingly built up in Chengtu. Interestingly, in direct opposition to Air Force 
doctrine, Wolfe ordered that this very first mission of the Twentieth AF – the one made 
up exclusively of the “super tactical” B-29 – be a nighttime attack with planes attacking 
individually, rather than in formation. He feared that his men did not have enough 
training under their belts to either bomb or even arrive at their target successfully in 
formation (it took more gas). Arnold, however, would not accept this and ordered a 
daylight mission, arguing that if the crews needed training in precision bombing, this was 
the time to do it. Ultimately, the raid was completed during the day – though thick fog led 
more than half the planes to bomb by radar rather than visually.107 But Wolfe’s 
assumption that the nighttime option was legitimate (and his decision to bomb by night 
                                                
106 Craven and Cate, vol. V, 81-91. 
107 E. Bartlett Kerr, Flames over Tokyo: the U.S. Army Air Force's Incendiary Campaign against Japan, 
1944-1945 (New York: D.I. Fine, 1991), 58-59; Craven and Cate, vol. V, 94-98. 
 INCENDIARY WARS  56 
for almost all his – admittedly few – future raids) is a clear indication of the way that 
commanders in the field understood the imperative of official doctrine. After Wolfe’s 
dismissal, there was a two month interlude before LeMay made it out to take command. 
By that time, four of the eight raids the command had managed to eek out were night 
attacks, and “perhaps the majority [of XX BC staff officers] had come to favor the 
employment of the Superfort exclusively as a night bomber.108  
On July 4th, less than a month after his first attack, Wolfe was fired and by August 
his replacement, General Curtis LeMay, was in India. In a way, Wolfe had accomplished 
what he could – he set up the supply system and streamlined the transport of materials as 
much as was feasible. However, judged against Wolfe’s own projection of the 
campaign’s possibilities – the MATTERHORN proposal was called "Early Sustained 
Bombing of Japan" – he’s brief tenure can hardly be considered successful. As Arnold 
wrote to General Carl Spaatz, commander of the Strategic Air Forces in Europe, Wolfe 
“did his best, and he did a grand job, but LeMay’s operations make Wolfe seem very 
amateurish.”109 LeMay was an unparalleled operator. And while he would not have much 
greater success with the XX BC than did Wolfe (he would manage bring up the sortie rate 
to once a week), the lessons he learned in China – which themselves built off his 
experiences in Europe – would form the basis for the switch to incendiary bombing 
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LeMay in China 
By the time LeMay arrived in China, he had a critical advantage over Wolfe: he 
had seen combat. Surely there were other attributes – LeMay was a doer, Wolfe a 
planner, etc. But above all, the major changes that LeMay implemented in the few 
months he spent with the XX BC were ones developed through the trial and error of his 
experiences with the Eighth Air Force in the European theater. Wolfe did not have the 
luxury of a previous command through which to work out the kinks, so his “shake-down” 
period had to be with Arnold’s baby, the B-29. LeMay would swoop in and, after some 
retraining, immediately begin to see (limited) results. It helped that, as opposed to Wolfe 
who helped craft the MATTERHORN plan, LeMay came in with a more guarded view: 
“no one could make [MATTERHORN] work. It was founded on an utterly absurd logistic 
basis.”110 The best LeMay could hope to do was to more efficiently use the resources that 
they could get over the hump. 
LeMay’s methodology is clear from his earliest actions upon assuming his first 
command in Germany. Placed in charge of the 305th Bomber Group, LeMay recalls that 
he immediately began “making a nuisance of [himself],” as he scrounged for pictures of 
bomb damage on targets, to get a sense of the groups’ accuracy. He was not one to trust 
the “common sense” of bombing, and he was going to find out for himself just how well 
his men were doing. And he would make it better. The problem, he found, was that the 
airmen were so concerned with the anti-aircraft flak that they would take evasive action 
during their bombing run. It was impossible, LeMay concluded, to “swing evasively all 
over the sky without throwing your bombs all over the lot too.”111 Either he had to settle 
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with the 305’s poor accuracy, or he would need to radically undermine the understanding 
that “if you fly straight and level for as much as ten seconds, the enemy are bound to 
shoot you down.”112 He chose the latter. 
What made LeMay such an impressive leader – not a visionary or theoretical 
genius – was his ability to identify the core practical obstacles to attaining efficiency, to 
solve them, and then to be so confident in his conclusions that everyone else is converted 
too, even though it flew in the face of everything they believed. Thus, before he took his 
group on their first combat mission – before he had ever been over a target – he was 
instructing his men that he “was going straight in…and…would be flying the lead 
aircraft.” As far as LeMay was concerned – and this is a theory he would stick to 
throughout his career – “if we we’re going to [the target] we’re going to get some bombs 
on [it], by God. And this is the only way I can see to do it.”113 LeMay’s focus was on 
getting the job done, and neither the prevailing wisdom nor the official doctrine would 
stop him from identifying the best way to accomplish that goal.114 As LeMay would say 
regarding an unorthodox low-altitude mission that he planned for the XXI BC against a 
Tokyo aircraft plant that had been targeted – and missed – five times before he took over: 
“Well, lets get it, instead of paying the price of a mission every time and going up there, 
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up there, up there, up there, and still not getting it.”115 As one mordant wing navigator put 
it “our job was to hit the target – planes and crews, it seemed, were expendable.”116 
This was the attitude the LeMay brought with him to India as he assumed 
command of the XX Bomber Group on August 29, 1944. He would leave just a bit more 
than four months later, and recommend to General Arnold to scrap the whole 
campaign.117 However, this does not mean that he accomplished nothing. LeMay used 
MATTERHORN as a kind of way station, a place to implant the best practices of Europe 
onto the Japanese theater, and to sort out the endless technical difficulties being offered 
up by the B-29 before they put it to serious use. The official Air Force history would 
similarly conclude that “no critic has challenged the utility or success of the command's 
shakedown process.” However, they are sure to point out the argument of the JWPC – 
rehashed by the USSBS – that “necessary training and combat experience with B-29's 
provided by this operation might have been secured through attacks on Outer Zone 
targets, from bases more easily supplied.”118 
Still, given that MATTERHORN was realized, it is useful to look at the three 
primary changes implemented by LeMay in China: the reorganization of the maintenance 
organization, new combat formations, and lead bomber training. In conjunction with the 
last two technical changes, LeMay also reinstated the primacy of daytime bombing over 
the nighttime attacks that the XX BC had become accustomed to. He was not wedded to 
daytime bombing – and surely not to nighttime attacks either – but was devoted to being 
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prepared for any and every situation.119 The inability to fly in formation during the day 
precluded half of all possible flying hours and limited the scope of bombing that the 
command was capable of. Thus, among LeMay’s first activities was to teach the crews a 
bombing formation and daytime flying techniques. 
German fighter resistance had taught LeMay early on that the four-plane diamond 
formation used by most bomber groups would not sufficiently protect an unescorted 
group against a concerted fighter attack. He developed a 12-plane combat box formation, 
a grouping that staggered the planes in altitude and to the front and back, which was 
intended to maximize the defensive firepower by ensuring that no plane was directly in 
front of another, yet still offered very tight bombing patterns. For a number of reasons, 
formation flying was only useful when flying during the day. Most practically, it was 
more dangerous to fly so close to another aircraft at night. Moreover, the defensive 
formation was unnecessary at night (when fighter resistance was negligible) and the 
tighter bombing pattern was made irrelevant by the imprecise non-visual radar bombing 
required by nighttime attacks. The reliance on night bombing had also meant that none of 
the crews were really familiar with their targets. So along with the insistence of formation 
flying, LeMay began a lead-bomber training school, where the most accurate bomber 
units were trained to be experts in individual target areas – each had to be able to “draw 
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[his] area freehand in [his] sleep.”120 These lead crews would be the navigators for each 
group and it would be upon their timing that all “other crews in a formation would drop” 
their bombs.121 
It is important to understand that this did not mean that LeMay rejected radar 
bombing, which was indispensable for operating during the notoriously bad weather of 
western Europe – and as LeMay would soon find out, perhaps rivaled in its dreadfulness 
only by the Japanese conditions. Indeed, one of LeMay’s first actions in the Marianas 
would be to implement a radar-training program, along with the changes he made in 
China. More than just an alternate bombing method, radar used effectively would allow 
planes to navigate to their targets in low visibility situations where even seeing rally 
points was impossible. Thus wrote LeMay to General Norstad (deputy chief of Air Staff 
and chief of staff, Twentieth AF) in late February, asking for the creation of an “intensive 
training program for radar operators” in the States. “In order to take advantage of 
conditions whereby target is visible for only limited periods during bombing approach,” 
he continued, “our units must be capable of utilizing radar to become established on 
prescribed axis of attack” [sic].122 
LeMay’s ideal would thus be "a ‘synchronous bombing’ in which both the 
bombardier and radar operator followed the bomb run in, with visibility determining who 
would control the plane during the crucial seconds before release.”123 However, it is 
equally – if not more – important to see that LeMay was anything if attached to night 
bombing or an abandonment of AAF precision doctrine. LeMay is sometimes portrayed 
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as itching for the opportunity to start incendiary area attacks or at least as planning it 
from the moment he took over the XXI BC in the Mariana’s in January 1945.124 But 
based on his actions upon taking command in China and (as we shall see shortly) the 
Marianas, nothing could be further from the truth. LeMay came in intent on giving 
himself and his team the greatest chance of accomplishing their mission of an "Early 
Sustained Bombing of Japan and that required the skills to bomb accurately, using all the 
tools at their disposal. 
It also depended on two other extrinsic factors, one somewhat within LeMay’s 
control and the other absolutely independent of him. Those were the mechanical issues 
and adverse weather conditions which prevented enough aircraft from either taking off or 
reaching their targets in the first place. 
Without a doubt, the B-29 was the most sophisticated and technically complex 
aircraft built during the war. Simply listing the raw material used in the production of the 
plane is awe-inspiring: “It took 27,000 pounds of sheet aluminum, over 1,000 pounds of 
copper, and 600,000 rivets to build one aircraft. There were about 9½ miles of wiring, 
and 2 miles of tubing in the Superfort.”125 With an average cruising speed of 253 mile per 
hour (mph) and a range of almost 5,500 miles, it could fly 70 mph faster and over twice 
as far as the B-17, while its 8-ton bomb load almost tripled it predecessor’s.126 It also 
included two state of the art technologies. Unlike other planes in which gunners had to 
man their individual weapons, the B-29’s twelve .50 caliber machine guns were 
controlled by a remote central fire control system, which stationed the gunners (other 
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than the tail gunner) away from the weapons themselves.127 The gunners thus remained 
within the pressurized cabin of the aircraft – the other cutting edge design feature, which 
was required to allow the plane to fulfill one of its main tasks: high-altitude flying.128 
Along with its range and increased bomb load, the altitude was the most important 
aspect of the B-29, essential for it to operate outside of the range of attack fighters and 
thus allow it to operate without the protection of pursuit aircraft. It was able to reach 
these great heights with the help of the 2,200 horsepower Wright Aeronautical R-3350 
radial engines. Though they were the most powerful engines available during the 1940 
bidding for the contract, the B-29’s abbreviated development process led to the engines 
being by far the most meddlesome aspect of an aircraft that LeMay describes as having 
“as many bugs as the entomological department at the Smithsonian Institute.”129 The 
engines would overheat, he explained, and “had a tendency to swallow valves. A valve 
would burn, and then the head would go off and chew up one of the engines eighteen 
cylinders. Sometimes the cylinder would, in turn, fly off and chew up the whole 
engine.…sometimes the whole damned engine seized and twisted right out of the 
wing.”130 The engine problems were the primary cause of aircraft losses during the India-
to-China “Hump” ferrying, exacerbated by the already too-hot ground temperatures in the 
tropical bases. All told, from February 1943 until July 1945, engine fires caused one-fifth 
of B-29 accidents. A commander would recall years later that “the only thing wrong with 
the B-29 was that it had a Wright engine.”131 
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It was therefore of utmost importance that the mechanical teams be at their most 
efficient, because they would have to perform hundreds of modifications to every plane 
the XX BC received, and expect to give special attention to its finicky engine. So LeMay 
centralized the maintenance program, based on a system he conceived of in Europe and 
perfected in China. He got rid of the previous system which tied a specific crew to 
maintain and supply each squadron – one that inherently led to waste and poor 
distribution of parts and labor – and put in its place a “production-line maintenance 
program for the whole base.”132 This allowed any mechanic to work on any plane that 
needed it and centralized the parts supply depot, a much more efficient use of resources, 
especially in China were supplies were scarce. Moreover, LeMay made it clear that even 
though the Army was supplying the bases, it would be the AAF group commander who 
would be in charge of the base. Just like Arnold realized that the Twentieth AF could not 
be responsible to an area commander, because his requirements would be different than 
those of the AAF, LeMay learned early in his European tour that base commanders had 
their own ideas of how to run a base, and that it often conflicted with getting the 
maximum planes into the air.133 LeMay reflected on his changes and found a convincing 
metric for the efficiency of his program. Once in place in the Marianas, LeMay had his 
command “flying a hundred and twenty hours a month on our airplanes. Four times as 
much as in England.” And this in the middle of the Pacific, far from supplies, and with a 
much more demanding plane than the B-17 of Europe.134 
So much for what he could control; not so the weather. Though accustomed to the 
poor visibility of Europe, LeMay was left in China without the weather services that were 
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available from the British. The Russians refused to pass along any information, and 
attempts to intercept and decode their weather reports proved difficult.135 Through an odd 
set of circumstances, LeMay – who later, as Chief the Air Force, would preside over the 
destruction of Vietnam in order to defeat the communists – came to have a good 
relationship with Mao in Northwestern China, and succeeded in getting some weather 
reports from him now and then. Still, the problem remained that Japan was more than 
1,700 miles away, and save for sending a reconnaissance flight ahead of time, LeMay had 
no way of knowing what conditions to expect over their target area or on the way.136 This 
was a problem that would continue to inhibit AAF actions through the rest of the war, 
and would be further aggravated by additional obstacles in the Pacific. 
There was, however, one tactic that seemed to provide a solution to the problem 
of poor visibility and high winds that wreaked havoc with the XX Bomber Command’s 
precision bombing accuracy: incendiaries. General Chennault, the commander of the 
Fourteenth AF in China had long been pestering LeMay to make an incendiary attack on 
the port city of Hankow, which was being used to supply the Japanese ground troops in 
China. LeMay continually repelled the requests, because it was a tactical mission in 
support of the Army, and thus outside of the B-29’s mandate of conducting strategic 
attacks. However, when intelligence found that a buildup was occurring for a large-scale 
attack on Kunming, a city “key to all American efforts in China,” Lt. Gen. Albert C. 
Wedemeyer, who had replaced Stilwell as commander of the CBI, invoked the one caveat 
of the Twentieth AF’s mandate: that theater commanders could divert the B-29 “should a 
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strategic or tactical emergency” arise. The JCS thus ordered LeMay to attack Hankow, 
which he complied with on December 18th, 1945.137 
As far as the technique of the bombing went, LeMay could not have been pleased. 
The attack was meant to be coordinated with Chennault’s Fourteenth AF, but a last-
minute message from Chennault to delay the attack for 45 minutes was never received, so 
the planes that arrived over the target bombed out of order, and of the 84 planes that 
dropped incendiaries during the daytime attack, only 33 dropped them on target. LeMay 
recounts that “everything was fouled up there, beginning with Chennault’s last minute 
request for a change…people dropped in the wrong sequence, smoke [from the fires 
started by the planes that arrived earlier] obscured the primary areas, and so on.”138 And 
yet, even with all this confusion, visibility problems, and poor aiming, the damage was 
very impressive. The command estimated that “40 to 50 per cent of the target area had 
been destroyed by 38 percent of the weight of attack.”139 Incendiaries had been selected 
because of the highly flammable wood and paper construction of the dock area, and the 
intuition paid off. Even without getting their bombs on target, LeMay’s airmen were able 




The Hankow raid was the first large-scale use of incendiary weapons on Japanese 
targets. Chennault would later imply that the Hankow attack – one that he recommended 
– was the inspiration for the raids from the Marianas that would devastate the Japanese 
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mainland, a claim that the official Air Force historians go out of their way to refute.140 
Part of Chennault’s assertion would require that LeMay became attached to the idea of 
incendiary bombing from that moment on, and indeed there is no evidence of that. When 
he got to the Marianas, LeMay undertook precision daylight bombing for the first month, 
until a directive from General Norstad ordered him to carry out an incendiary attack 
against Kobe in early February. 
In fact, though the Hankow raid’s success surely pleased LeMay, it appears that 
neither he nor his higher-ups in the Twentieth thought too much about it at the time, 
especially because “neither Arnold or LeMay wanted to bomb Hankow.”141 It was a 
successful attack, but a tactical one all the same, and aerial achievement was supposed to 
confirm AAF independence, not undermine it. Still, in LeMay’s memoir, he brings up the 
Hankow attack during his discussion of the rationale for the March 1945 switch to 
incendiary tactics.142 So while the Hankow raid did not implant the goal of incendiary 
bombing into LeMay’s mind – and surely not the kind that LeMay sent over Tokyo on 
March 9/10, with its drastic shifts in technique (nighttime, low-level, etc.), as opposed to 
simply the type of ordinance – it remained there nonetheless as a moment where his 
bombers overcame adverse weather and poor accuracy. And when weather and other 
complications began to build up in the Marianas, this memory would be recalled as 
precedent for a potential solution. 
Ultimately it would be LeMay – and LeMay only – who would make the decision 
to send in his planes on incendiary attacks of urban areas. The success of the raids 
retroactively imputed his very controversial revisions to bombing technique with an air of 
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brilliance. And it is rightly deserved. Like his decision in Germany to go in straight and 
level against German anti-aircraft defense, his instructions for the low-level nighttime 
incendiary attack with B-29s stripped of their guns was based on a supreme self-
confidence in his own reason and a disdain for the tyranny of “common sense.” Unlike in 
Germany, he would not be leading the mission himself, and his ability to compel his men 
was a mix of their belief in him with their inability to question a direct order. 
That said, without taking anything away from the revolutionary character of 
LeMay’s actual order, it is clear that the fact that he was even able to make such a 
decision was contingent on a processes which had been progressing since the start of the 
war. His almost unconscious choice to use M-69 napalm incendiaries against the 
Japanese mainland (another difference between the Hankow raid and all that followed), 
the ones that inflicted such wanton destruction on the island nation, was decided on by 
civilian advisors in Washington long before LeMay even thought to firebomb Tokyo. 
General Hansell admitted years later that inherent in the ACTS doctrine of precision 
bombing was a necessity to bring in non-military experts to define what exactly 
constituted a “vital point.” As AAF practice began to increasingly rely on the conclusions 
of these operations analyst’s reports, decisions which were supposed to reflect the 
military’s principles were being largely determined by civilian experts – often individuals 
involved in the war industry and munitions procurement. The story of the M-69’s path 
from conception to deployment and the Committee of Operations Analysis’s reports on 
Japanese target priorities are examples of the civilian ability to control military 
imperatives by limiting their perceived options. Cast within the specific circumstances of 
anti-oriental racism, inter-service rivalries, and poor performance, the M-69 and urban 
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area attacks would emerge – seemingly out of thin air – as the long-awaited solution to all 
of the airmen’s problems. A closer look will reveal the concerted effort to make these 
options appear self-evident. 
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"Operation tonight will be largest yet if plan can be carried out. The effect may be significant…. [it] may 
be an outstanding show…. leave no doubt that this is an important operation…. this is a big one."143 
 
Cable from General Norstad to Commander, Twentieth Air Force (Arnold) 
March 9th, 1945 
 
Part III: The Road to MEETINGHOUSE 
The Marianas 
The story of the firebombing of Japan really begins with LeMay’s arrival in the 
Marianas in late January 1945. But the path to the fateful March 9th mission began to 
coalesce months earlier, on October 12th, 1944 when General Haywood Hansell arrived 
in the island of Saipan in the Marianas to create the XXI Bomber Command.144 Hansell 
had been awarded the command of the XXI on August 29th, 1944 – the same day that 
LeMay took over from General Wolfe in India. The overlap is not a coincidence. LeMay 
had originally been slated to take the XXI, while Hansell would get the planned XXII 
Bomber Command which was to be established out of the Philippines. With Wolfe’s 
dismissal, however, the list was pushed up and with LeMay heading to China, Hansell 
took the XXI.145 
Before taking control of the XXI command, Hansell had been the Chief of Staff 
of the Twentieth AF, one of General Arnold’s protégées, a chief planner of ACTS 
doctrine and AWPD-1 and -42, and a commander in the European Theater. He seemed to 
be the ideal candidate for taking charge of the main proving grounds for Arnold’s 
Twentieth and its B-29 weapon. His background in air theory led him to stick doggedly to 
the concept of precision strategic bombing as the only acceptable method of aerial attack. 
                                                
143 “Forthcoming Operation” Norstad to COMAF 20, 3/9/45, Message Number FN-09-3, RG 18, Entry 57C 
Box 71 (HQ 20th AF Message Files, 1944-5), NARA. 
144 Craven and Cate, vol. V, 546. 
145 Searle, 129-30. 
 INCENDIARY WARS  71 
He was faced, however, with many of the problems that LeMay faced in India – terrible 
weather, poor bombing accuracy, and mechanical issues – which would make precision 
bombing untenable as an effective tactical approach. 
Many, including Hansell’s biographer and likely even Hansell himself attribute 
his dismissal from the XXI command to his resistance to area attacks.146 This is surely 
plausible, but more important was generally his lack of success with the precision 
doctrine as he executed it. General Norstad, who replaced Hansell as chief of staff (and 
was a friend of his) described the problem as not so much Hansell’s rejection of any 
particular tactic, but of an overall "utter absolute complete and irreversible lack of 
competence."147 The urge to explain Hansell’s dismissal in light of area bombing is 
convenient for a number of reasons, most obviously because it portrays his firing as a 
stand against the immortality of area bombing rather than a vote of no confidence. But 
more importantly, it serves to attribute the genesis of the area attacks to the top echelon 
of the Air Force. If Arnold and Norstad fired Hansell and installed LeMay because the 
former would not consent to incendiary attacks while the latter would, it would mean 
that, as Hansell asserts “a change in strategic interest” had taken place in Washington.148 
Reality, however, does not appear to be as clear-cut. Hansell was relieved of his 
command for a number of reasons, most of them practical, some personal, but none of 
them seemed to be specifically in reference to a refusal to use incendiary bombs. This is 
most evident from the fact that, in response to a directive from Norstad on 12/18/1944, 
asking for “a full-scale incendiary attack on Nagoya…as an ‘urgent requirement’ for 
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planning purposes,” Hansell duly protested but carried out the mission on January 3rd 
nonetheless.149 He would use incendiaries in urban attacks if instructed to, but simply did 
not use them – or any bombs, it seems – very well. In addition, the record does not 
support the notion that LeMay entered the Marianas with the objective of setting Japan 
alight. Just days before he began his incendiary campaign, LeMay cabled Norstad about 
how bad the weather had become, and explained that he had begun “working on several 
very radical methods of employment of the force.” He lamented the fact that he would 
have to bomb by night – “I don’t believe it is an efficient method of operation – but “a 
few bombs on the target [is] better than no bombs at all.”150 LeMay was far from excited 
to abandon precision doctrine, but he was interested in results, and he had yet to see any. 
LeMay’s reluctance to abandon precision doctrine is also borne out by his 
February 1945 calculation of his command’s ordinance needs for the following months. 
He planned for average bomb loads of 4 tons (split into 60% high explosives and 40% 
incendiary – a pretty standard mix) and an average sortie rate of 735 per month, which 
would leave him with just over 3,500 tons of incendiaries for March. Yet in just the first 
three of the five incendiary missions that he would send with planes carrying 6 tons of 
exclusively incendiary weapons, the Twentieth saw 948 planes drop 3,900 tons of bombs 
– more than the entire amount planned for the month in the span of four days.151 The 
decision and success of the incendiary attack took LeMay by surprise just as it did 
everyone else. Immediately thereafter he would go to Admiral Nimitz (who was 
responsible for supplying the Twentieth) and request a reassessment of munitions 
                                                
149 Craven and Cate, vol. V, 564-5. 
150 LeMay to Norstad, 3/3/45, Curtis LeMay Papers, Library of Congress, Washington D.C. 
http://www.scribd.com/doc/37161159/Curtis-E-LeMay-and-Lauris-Norstad-Correspondence. 
151 Ibid., 621. 
 INCENDIARY WARS  73 
requirements based on a previously unthinkable rate of bombing: 120 flying hours per 
month with 6 tons of incendiaries in the holds. The best anyone had done in Europe was 
30 hours and LeMay already had planned for 60 in the Pacific. Nimitz thought him crazy 
– LeMay paraphrased Nimitz’s response as “Go away, boy, don’t bother us.”152 But again 
LeMay was proved correct as the Twentieth was forced to stop its incendiary “blitz 
week” after five missions in ten days, because they had exhausted their incendiary stocks. 
They would be unable to restart them for another six weeks, at which point supplies 
finally arrived.153 
In fact, a comparison of both LeMay and Hansell’s early missions shows very 
little difference: “Only two of Hansell's first nine missions against Japan were area raids 
and only two of LeMay's first eight missions against Japan from the Marianas were area 
raids.”154 A better – and more humorous – explanation is that ““LeMay was writing half-
page reports telling Arnold what he did yesterday, and Hansell was writing a three-page 
report explaining why the mission aborted.”155 It was his shortcoming as an operator and 
commander in general, in contrast to LeMay’s excellence, that was to be Hansell’s 
undoing – not any one decision in particular. LeMay had already “went through the time 
and trouble [with the B-29] over in India before they got the Hansell outfit out [to the 
Marianas].”156 LeMay was always a step or two ahead of Hansell, and when he took over 
the command, he would waste little time setting up a maintenance and organizational 
system that he had already proven in China. Thus he could immediately get to work on 
improving the XXI bombing results.  
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Finally, while air leaders in Washington had begun to show greater interest in 
incendiaries, this interest was hardly new, nor was it a “change in strategic interest.” The 
desire to use incendiaries against urban areas fell squarely within the framework of 
strategic bombing as established by ACTS doctrine and reflected a much more subtle and 
complex policy and planning structure in the Air Force than is being portrayed by 
Hansell’s unitarian “Washington.” 
A brief accounting of Hansell and LeMay’s early raids will help put the choice to 
use incendiaries into perspective. Per the Committee of Operations Analysts, the target-
selecting group for the Twentieth AF (more on this group later), the overriding priority 
for the Air Force was the Japanese aircraft industry, which, until a belated industry 
dispersal program, was centralized almost exclusively in the six largest cities on 
Honshu.157 Thus, all but one of Hansell’s raids were precision attacks (even when 
incendiaries were used) directed against the aircraft industry. To Hansell and Arnold’s 
dismay, however, intent does not destroy targets. Hansell’s first mission is illustrative of 
the average results of his attempted attacks against the Japanese mainland. 
Delayed for almost a week because of poor weather both in the Marianas and over 
Tokyo, Hansell finally got 111 B-29s carrying 277.5 tons of bombs off the ground on 
November 24th, 1944, for the XXI bomber command’s first mission against the 
Musashino aircraft plant near Tokyo. Performance would only get worse. Before 
reaching the target, 17 planes aborted and returned home, while mechanical problems 
prevented another six from dropping their bombs.158 The weather over Japan made 
bombing near impossible for everyone else. LeMay would recall that “The weather at 
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high altitude [over Japan] was unquestionably the worst bomber weather in the world.”159 
At 30,000 feet over the Japanese mainland, the altitude set as the operational floor for B-
29 precision bombing, the Twentieth met a theretofore unheard of “phenomenon known 
as the jet stream.”160 At that height, winds blew at speeds as high as 230 miles per hour, 
wreaking havoc on the bombardier’s accuracy and the pilot’s ability to control the 
aircraft. Flying with the wind at its tail, the B-29 would reach speeds of over 500 miles 
per hour, far beyond the calibration ability of the Norden bombsight, rendering it – and 
any hopes of precise bombing – obsolete. The alternative, to fly into the wind, was 
equally impossible, because it would slow the B-29 to the snail’s pace of 125 miles per 
hour, easy prey for the roving Japanese fighter planes. 
If that was not enough, clouds blanketed the island nation almost every day. One 
historian mentions that “the Japanese home islands experience two seasonal weather 
patterns – winter and summer.”161 Perhaps he should have said “cloudy and cloudier.” 
LeMay recalls that the weather limited precision to “three or four days a month,” seven at 
most.162 Demanding that all attacks be visual precision attacks would lead to 
unacceptable sortie rates by any account – even if they were all hugely successful. But of 
course they weren’t. Going back to Hansell’s first mission on November the 24th, “an 
undercast almost completely obscured the target. Only twenty-four planes bombed the 
Musashino plant.” The rest bombed the secondary targets of docks and urban areas, 
around half resorting to radar bombing. In the words of the official Air Force historians 
                                                
159 Quoted in Curatola, 39. 
160 Curatola, 41. 
161 Ibid., 37. 
162 LeMay, Mission, 344. 
 INCENDIARY WARS  76 
“bombing results of the mission were not encouraging…. [only] 1 percent of the building 
area and 2.4 percent of the machinery were damaged.”163 
Hansell would return to this target four more time and LeMay another three. Their 
eight failed attempts to destroy the Musashino aircraft plant – the most important 
industrial target in Japan164 – epitomized the failure of precision bombing as a functional 
doctrine for the war against Japan. Fittingly, LeMay’s last precision attack before 
beginning his major incendiary campaign was another failed attempt to destroy the 
elusive Musashino plant on March 4th, 1945. Again, to quote the Air Force historians, 
who also summarize the success of the campaign against other precision targets: 
This eighth fiasco at [Musashino] marked the end of a well-defined phase of XXI Bomber 
Command's operations. The effort to knock out the Japanese aircraft industry by high-altitude, 
daylight precision bombing of carefully selected targets had failed…. Not one of the nine high-
priority targets had been destroyed…. [Musashino] had suffered only 4 per cent damage after 835 
B-29 sorties had been sent against it.165 
 
Not all the raids were as poor as the ones led against this plant, and ironically, 
Hansell’s final mission was a rousing success, or more correctly “a welcome interlude in 
this litany of failure.”166 Sixty-two of the 77 B-29s succeeded in bombing the Kawasaki 
aircraft plant near Kobe, destroying 38% of its roof and cutting its production by 90%, 
with no aircraft losses. But on the whole the numbers tell a sobering story. The post war 
bombing survey reported that “of 16 attacks executed at high altitudes during the early 
days of operations, 4 completely failed to bomb the primary target, 7 bombed with three-
quarters of the airborne force, and 5 with less than three-quarters of the mission force.”167 
Adding in the first few missions under LeMay’s command, the first 22 missions saw 
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2,148 sorties that dropped a combined 5,398 tons of bombs, with only half of the B-29s 
bombing primary targets. Losses had been prohibitive, reaching 5.7% of planes by 
January 1945.168 
It is very telling that when describing an alternative target system (railroads) that 
the U.S. could have focused on for decisive results in Japan, the USSBS opines that the 
“use of high-precision forms of air attack, particularly carrier-based aircraft, at the two 
vital bottlenecks at the extremities of· the island of Honshu would have strengthened the 
campaign” (italics mine).169 So poor was B-29 accuracy, that when giving an example of 
“high-precision” attacks, the USSBS ignored the B-29 – the aircraft designed for high-
altitude precision attacks! 
 
Pressure Mounts 
The B-29’s failure to inflict any significant damage on the Musashino plant was 
more significant than just serving as an apt microcosm for the failure of precision tactics. 
Just a few weeks before LeMay’s final attempt on the plant – and two days before his 
previous try – the Navy launched a carrier-based attack with low-flying planes bearing 
small bombs, and had exacted significant damage on the plant.170 If the Navy could in 
one attack do more damage than the Twentieth could in eight, Arnold would be hard 
pressed to rationalize the Twentieth’s continued existence – let alone its independence. 
Indeed, on February 16th, a day before the Navy raid on Musashino, but after reading a 
news clipping of an earlier successful Navy attack on Tokyo telling of “the Navy’s fifteen 
hundred planes hitting Japan proper,” Arnold cabled General Giles to register his concern 
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“over the number of B-29s actually employed in operations against Japan.” “I would not 
be surprised,” Arnold continued ominously, “to see the control of the Twentieth Air 
Force pass to either Nimitz or MacArthur.”171 
Aside from two test incendiary attacks run (with modest but promising results) 
against Kobe and Tokyo at Norstad’s behest, LeMay had not altered his bombing tactics 
much from Hansell’s. He had instituted his characteristic organizational changes – lead 
bomber school, radar training, centralizing maintenance (a processes Hansell had begun) 
– but was still adhering to precision bombing, though he lowered the altitude to slightly 
below 30,000 feet. Suddenly, LeMay had been in the Marianas for two months and 
“hadn’t done anything much yet. I’d better do something,” he told himself.172 He was not 
the only one telling him that. If General Arnold was feeling the pressure, then so would 
his subordinates. LeMay explained that “General Arnold needed results. [General] Larry 
Norstad had made that very plain. In effect he had said: “You go ahead and get results 
with the B-29. If you don’t get results you’ll be fired…also there’ll never be any Strategic 
Air Forces of the Pacific.”173 
It is important, also, not to get caught in a Pacific-centric mindset, and to realize 
that the travails of the Twentieth in the Pacific were also being understood in the context 
of the suddenly escalating war in Europe. The Battle of the Bulge – the last-ditch 
maximum effort German counteroffensive in the Ardennes – had set back the AAF’s 
hopes of establishing the Eighth AF as a strategic bombing unit. Suddenly, after months 
of pounding German industry and petroleum reserves, they were diverted back to tactical 
support of the advancing Allied infantry. Equally important, it seemed to prove, as 
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Secretary Stimson told the President, that the U.S. is unlikely “to break down organized 
German resistance…by constant bombardment.”174 More than ever, the future of the 
independent Air Force rested on the wings of the B-29. “We have built up ideas in the 
Army, the Navy, and among civilians of what we can do with our B-29s,” Arnold 
explained. “These airplanes are quite expensive…and yet our results are far from what 
we expects and from what everyone else expects.”175 
These results would be realized through a radical reevaluation of precision tactics 
(though, as I will explain below, not strategic doctrine), but also would come at the 
expense of alternative, perhaps even more effective options. Part of the urgency to see 
results was to fend off Navy grabs at the coveted B-29. It was a fear that permeated the 
entire ranks. One B-29 airman recalled hearing that “the Navy…was finally on the verge 
of pouncing. Wasn’t it time, the Admirals were saying to face reality and turn the B-29s 
over to the Fleet as a tactical support arm?”176 Thus, not only would impressive results 
have to emerge from the Twentieth AF, but critically, they must not be seen to 
corroborate the Navy’s claims that the aircraft would best serve the war effort in a tactical 
role. 
We already have seen the AAF’s strong resistance to any attempt to co-opt their 
strategic bombers for tactical missions (TORCH in North Africa, OVERLORD in 
preparation for D-Day), and the same would be true in the Pacific. LeMay’s planes would 
be diverted twice during his command, in the middle of February to support the invasion 
of Iwo Jima (DETACHMENT) and in mid-April – diverting the XXI from the incendiary 
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campaign – to assist with the taking of Okinawa (ICEBERG). LeMay attempted to resist 
these encroachments, but Navy area commanders invoked the emergency statute in the 
Twentieth’s charter. More importantly, these islands were being invaded to facilitate Air 
Force bases. LeMay could hardly deny a few weeks of help when thousands of Marines 
were to give their lives for his command.177 
More significant was Hansell and (at first) LeMay’s resistance to assisting the 
Navy in mine laying campaigns in Japanese harbors, again because it would be a tactical 
diversion which would make the Navy look good. And in the zero-sum game of credit for 
being the primary cause of American victory, a Navy success was an Air Force loss. 
Post-war analysis found that perhaps nothing led to Japan’s downfall more than the 
blockade of her coasts. The USSBS Summary Report maintained that “by August 1945, 
even without direct air attack on her cities and industries, the over-all level of Japanese 
war production would have declined below the peak levels of 1944 by 40 to 50 percent 
solely as a result of the interdiction of overseas imports.”178 Hansell describes the “cool 
reception” given to the aerial mining campaign by the XXI, and his protests to General 
Arnold to postpone any pledges of aircraft for mining until more of a force was built up. 
Nonetheless, on December 22nd, Arnold ordered him to establish a mining-
technique training program, but set the mission for April 1945 rather than January. It 
would be LeMay who – separating out the 313th Bombardment Wing on Tinian for the 
task – would oversee the bulk of the training and the campaign itself, aptly titled 
OPERATION STARVATION.179 It seems that the Air Force offered this extraordinary 
assistance not out of a belief in mining, but again a fear that if they rejected the request, 
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that the Navy would have cause to procure their own long-range aircraft for the task.180 
The irony is that, of all the B-29s used throughout the Pacific, the USSBS found that 
“those air units which had anti-shipping attacks as their prime mission…achieved against 
ships the best results for the effort expended” in the entire war.181 In 46 missions, the 
313th flew 1,500 sorties and dropped 12,000 mines and lost just 15 planes in an operation 
that Admiral Nimitz would call “phenomenal” and “a source of gratification.”182 The 
initial resistance to the mining effort took a promising alternative to precision bombing 
off the table. Few plausible choices were available other than a switch to area attacks. 
 
Firestorm 
It was LeMay’s tactical response to the numerous challenges facing the XXI that 
was the most radical and innovative aspect of the shift to area bombing, not the doctrinal 
shift itself. As we saw in Part I, ACTS doctrine had been established as a tautological 
capability-driven scheme, where the (largely imagined) capacity of the Air Force was 
channeled into a doctrine to endorse and reinforce that potential. It is for that reason that 
incendiary attacks – even when aimed against industrial targets – seemed to be a rejection 
of AAF strategic doctrine. The inherent inaccuracy of incendiaries contradicted the 
precision aspect of the strategy, even though the aim of the mission was still to cripple a 
strategic asset. Sherry argues that the incendiary campaign was an example of 
“technological fanaticism” in which the ability to destroy clouded the Air Force’s 
conception of the purposes of that very destruction. I would argue the opposite: that it 
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was not the Air Force in 1945 that suffered from this malady, but rather the 1935 ACTS 
planners and the apostles of precision bombing who lost sight of the real purpose of 
strategic bombing. Recall that strategic bombing was conceived of in terms of efficiency: 
that bottlenecks existed, could be targeted best by the precision capabilities of the Air 
Force, and thus strategic bombing should be conceived of as precision bombing. This was 
not the gospel, just its explication. It was a kind of planning known as “blueprint 
availability syndrome,” wherein “the types of intelligence available and examined will 
necessarily shape one's view on how a system operates.”183 When circumstances showed 
the technique to be faulty, the doctrine had to change. 
Conceived as such, we see that the biggest change that LeMay instituted was not 
the decision to attack urban areas – indeed, this was still conceived of in strategic terms. 
Rather, it was the method of attack: low-altitude, nighttime, single file (rather than in 
formations), without defensive armaments, and with only incendiary bombs. These 
choices, while brilliant, themselves seemed to emerge organically, in a logical syllogism. 
If weather at 30,000 feet made precision bombing impossible, then altitude had to be 
reduced. But reduced altitude would make the unescorted B-29s too vulnerable to 
Japanese fighter planes. However, the heavy attrition rate of Japanese pilots had seriously 
drained the Empire of skilled pilots. By the time of surrender, the average Japanese pilot 
had “just over 100 hours [of flight time], as contrasted to 600 hours for United States 
pilots,”184 and Japan really had no night fighters to speak of. So the attack would be at 
night, when fighter opposition could be discounted. But what of the anti-aircraft 
defenses? LeMay studied them in depth, and found that “the Japanese just didn’t seem to 
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have those 20- and 40-millimeter guns. That’s the type of defense which must be used 
against bombers coming in to attack at a low or medium altitude.”185 Antiaircraft fire 
calibrated to hit planes at 30,000 feet would be too slow to follow planes flying at 5,000-
9,000 feet, because the planes appear to cross the sky much faster. So the planes would 
come in really low and at night. 
But if they came at night with little chance of interception, there was no need for 
the extra weight (or risk of friendly fire) from defensive guns – so those too were 
removed. Unnecessary too was formation flying, which wasted gas, risked collision, and 
was only useful for defensive purposes. Most importantly, nighttime attacks precluded 
precision tactics, and thus it was pointless to use high explosives. If the bombing would 
be inaccurate, the AAF might as well use a munitions intended to be used that way, so 
incendiaries – 6 tons of them, from the extra weight freed up – were carried on the raids. 
Simple, clean, logical, and crucially, not begun with the desire to kill civilians or reject 
precision doctrine, but simply out of a recognition of the failure of precision tactics. 
That said, it is impossible to discuss the urban incendiary attacks without at least 
addressing the fact that hundreds of thousands of human beings were killed and severely 
injured, and millions were rendered homeless. The incendiary campaign began in earnest 
on the night of March 9th, 1945, and continued with little reprieve for 10 days. In that 
time, five missions were run against four cities – Tokyo, Kobe, Oska, and Nagoya 
(twice). The first raid, code named MEETINGHOUSE was staged against Tokyo’s urban 
center, and saw 279 of the 325 B-29s that took to the air that night drop 1,665 tons of 
incendiaries – almost half a million individual bombs. Most of the planes were loaded 
with 24 500-pound clusters of 6.2 lb M-69 tail ejection napalm incendiaries, which upon 
                                                
185 LeMay, Mission, 346. 
 INCENDIARY WARS  84 
impact would shoot a flaming stream of jellied gasoline up to 50 feet away, immediately 
igniting any flammable objects in its vicinity, The lead bombers carried larger 70-pound 
M47 incendiaries that would be used as pathfinders – dropped by the most skilled 
bombardiers to outline the edges of the target area.186 As fires cropped up throughout the 
city, the air above became superheated and sucked cool air upward, creating a cyclone-
like effect on the ground level: a firestorm. 
Frankly, the only way I can describe the true horror of the scene – literally a 
holocaust – is from someone who witnessed some of it, and even he with the help of a 
professional writer. Col. Robert Morgan, veteran of the European theater (and pilot of the 
famous Memphis Belle) was flying the Dauntless Dotty that night over Tokyo. The 
experience of airmen over the fire was difficult in its own right: 
Most of the Japanese…fighters still sat, some melted, on their airstrips. Of those that had 
managed to get into the air, the thermal windstorms whipped up by the fires tossed them about the 
skies like helpless kites…the violent flames were literally burning the oxygen out of the 
atmosphere. The updrafts brought with them a sickening odor, an odor that I will never be able to 
get completely out of my nostrils – the smell of roasting human flesh.…some pilots and crewmen 
gagged and vomited…a few had passed out… 
As the fires surged into vacuums created by the eaten-up oxygen, wind velocity 
increased, and scrambling human herds were overtaken by hundred-mile-an-hour firewinds. In 
their desperation, thousands of men, women, and children flocked towards the rivers and canals 
that cut through Tokyo, but these only yielded other forms of hideous death. Jumpers drowned, 
were asphyxiated, or were crushed to death by succeeding waves of jumpers. Soon, the steel 
girders of the bridges spanning the waters grew white hot, forcing refugees to jump into water that 
itself was beginning to boil.187 
 
As a member of a Japanese military rescue crew recalled: 
In the black Sumida River, countless bodies were floating, clothed bodies, naked bodies, all as 
black as charcoal. It was unreal. These were dead people but you couldn’t tell whether they were 
men or women. You couldn’t even tell if the objects floating by were arms and legs or pieces of 
burnt wood.188 
 
The Japanese’ primitive neighborhood fire-fighting system was crushed under the sheer 
weight of the attack. The few fire engines were quickly reduced to hunks of metal, while 
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homeowners soon decided to flee rather than attempt to contain the growing flames 
licking their walls.189 The firestorm that erupted in Tokyo was due to a particularly dense 
urban area, with highly flammable structures separated by narrow roads and few 
firebreaks. By the end of the night “an area of 15.8 square miles had been burned out. 
This included 18 percent of the industrial area, 63 percent of the commercial area, and the 
heart of the congested residential district. The XXI Bomber Command's intelligence 
officers struck off their lists twenty-two numbered [that is, important] industrial 
targets.”190 Numbers vary regarding the casualties that night, and recent scholarship has 
found that it is likely that more people were killing in the Tokyo raid of March 9th than at 
either Hiroshima or Nagasaki.191 The USSBS found that 250,000 buildings were 
destroyed, while 87,793 people were killed, 40,918 were injured, and 1,008,005 were 
rendered homeless in what an AAF General later called “the greatest single disaster 
incurred by any enemy in military history.”192 It was a remarkably clear night: tail 
gunners on the return trip could see the glow for 150 miles. 
Not all the urban fire raids were that massive, and none inflicted as many 
casualties, likely because a retreat from cities to the countryside was immediately 
initiated. Still, by the end of the 10-day “blitz week,” the Twentieth AF had flown 1,595 
sorties – three-fourths of all previous Twentieth AF missions – while the 8,365 tons of 
bombs dropped were three times the weight dropped until that point. 32 square miles and 
many important industrial targets – and hundreds of thousands of civilians – were 
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destroyed and killed, with only a 0.9 percent attrition rate of B-29s.193 The success of the 
new tactics was undeniable, and the Joint Target Group (JTG) was quick to incorporate 
the best-practices into future targeting policy. Their response was enlightening. After 
studying the results of the incendiary bombings, the JTG found that there “were no 
strategic bottlenecks in the Japanese industrial and economic system except aircraft 
engine plants.”194 The JTG then adopted a two-phase incendiary campaign: phase one 
would direct LeMay against urban areas with important industrial targets, while the 
second phase was to be assessed after completion of the first, but would likely not include 
inherently important targets. The fact that incendiary low level incendiary bombing 
worked did not have to mean that there were no bottlenecks in Japan. But the notion of 
the efficiency of bottlenecks was the basis for precision bombing. With precision 
bombing shown to no longer be efficient, it therefore had to follow (in Air Force-ese) that 
bottlenecks did not exist. In that way, their doctrine was not wrong, nor was it being 
contravened. It just must not have been applicable to that case. 
 
The argument that attacking urban areas was immoral is based on the assumption 
that (1) many civilians were being deliberately put in harm’s way and (2) it served no 
military purpose, and that it only intended to demoralize the population, which is not a 
legitimate military target. It therefore would be a rejection of U.S. air doctrine as well, 
because strategic bombing was meant to attack only military or economic targets to 
destroy the enemy’s ability to wage war. 
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After the poor performance of precision bombing, the switch to urban attacks 
might appear to have been an abandonment of the entire project of strategic bombing, 
especially if strategic bombing is only understood in terms of precision bombing. Perhaps 
LeMay decided to simply terrorize the public in hopes that the sheer horror would end the 
war. But, as shown above, that is manifestly not the process that brought about the 
incendiary attacks. We know this partially because by March 9th, the U.S. plan was still 
based on a proposed November 1945 invasion, so the point of the air attack was never 
capitulation, it was to weaken the economy and infrastructure – still a strategic attack, 
just with different methods. But as we saw from the original planning of ACTS doctrine, 
methods and ends, capability and doctrine were inextricably intertwined. As the former 
was found to be wanting, the latter changed of course. 
It is important to understand the perceptions of the Japanese industry and 
economy that the American military and its intelligence community held during WWII, 
and the effects accomplished by the urban attacks. In hindsight we know that “before the 
air attacks against the cities began, war production had been steadily declining because of 
the ever-increasing shortages of raw materials, skilled labor, and an ill conceived 
dispersal program which was initiated too late.”195 However, planners at the time still saw 
the urban economy as a prime target because, in the end of 1944, as they formed the 
target lists “in the [Japanese] urban economy, the aircraft and ordnance industries 
achieved particularly impressive gains…. Aircraft reaching its highest peak in October, 
ordnance in November.”196 
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The AAF also had poor information about actual Japanese industrial organization, 
and based much of their analysis on pre-war intelligence. That information told them that 
a substantial amount of the war industry was provided by home-industry, factories 
employing as few as one or two people. As LeMay explained: 
In Japan they would be set up like this: they’d have a factory; and then the families, in their homes 
throughout the area, would manufacture small parts. You might call it a home-folks assembly line 
deal. The Suzuki clan would manufacture bolt 64; the Harunobo family next door might be 
making nut 64, 65, or 63, or all the gaskets in between. These would be manufactured right in the 
same neighborhood. Then Mr. Kitagawa from the factory would scoot around with his cart and 
pick up the parts in proper order.197 
 
It was these industries – both the plants themselves and the men (and women) that 
operated them – that were the targets of urban attacks. That is why a 1945 memo to the 
Commanding General USSTAAF regarding Japanese bombardment listed among its 
primary objectives to “complete the present program against industrial concentrations 
and stores located in urban areas (italics mine).”198 The industry was a primary – not 
secondary – objective, though as Arnold and others understood, “it was practically 
impossible to destroy the war output of Japan without doing more damage to civilians 
connected with the output than in Europe.”199 
After the war, it was found out that, in fact, these home-industries had largely 
disappeared in the industrialization and pre-war buildup for the war effort. “Before the 
urban attacks began,” explained the USSBS, “‘home’ industry, in the strict sense of 
household industry (which by Japanese definition included plants with up to 10 workers) 
had almost disappeared.”200 This, of course, was not known by LeMay or any of the air 
planners at the time, and the growth in output during the end of 1944 was reason enough 
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to suspect that a strong feeder system still existed. Still, some historians, while 
recognizing the limits of intelligence at the time, attempt to argue that more should have 
or could have been known, and structure their argument such that – though the writers are 
in the clear by acknowledging the lack of information – they leave the reader to judge the 
intent of the actors based on the outcomes only known through hindsight.201 
But even without the home-industry, LeMay and the planners were not wrong in 
analyzing the economic importance of these areas. Many Tokyo component factories 
were of the small to medium order – from 50 to 10,000 workers – and “the effect of the 
urban raids on the great number of plants within that range was extensive.”202 Most 
importantly, in view of the strategic doctrine of the Air Force and the idea of 
“bottlenecks” on which it stood – that is, attacking down-line production to stymie final 
assembly (recall the spring and propeller inspiration) – “the effect of the area raids was 
felt most by plants manufacturing components for large end-product customers. The chief 
value of those raids would have been to interrupt end-product manufacture by creating 
component shortages.”203 A post-war survey of plant managers found that “damage to 
component suppliers was cited as the primary cause of component failure among the 33 
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customer plants [surveyed].”204 As far as the aim of strategic bombing was to cripple the 
enemy’s war-making ability, the urban incendiary attacks appear to constitute a textbook 
case of its implementation. 
The effect on the workers was also impressive: 37 percent of all evacuees who 
had jobs were employed in the war-industry.205 If we can allow ourselves to ignore the 
fact that collateral damage here was human beings, then compared to the abject failure of 
precision bombing, an effect rate of over one-third was not a bad result. Ultimately, the 
urban attacks did not succeed as much as was anticipated in spreading to and damaging 
the larger factories, but between the precision and area attacks, the aircraft engine plants 
saw a 75% decrease in production and airframe plants one of 60%.206 Again, it is 
doubtful that much of that was accomplished by the precision campaign. 
In April the Twentieth AF was diverted to assist the invasion of Okinawa. Upon 
resuming incendiary attacks on May 14th, they continued their bombing of industrial 
cities, attacking another 11 cities through June 15th, at which point phase one of the new 
JTG directive was complete. During the entire March-June urban attack against industrial 
capabilities in the 6 largest cities, 6,960 planes had dropped 41,592 tons of bombs on 
Japanese cities, destroying 105.6 square miles (including 56.3 square miles of Tokyo – 
half of the entire urban area).207 
 After June 15th, the nature of the attack changed much more significantly than it did 
even on March 9th, but less conspicuously. By that point, there were no more economic 
targets worth attacking in Japan. The entire bombing campaign until that point had been 
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based on the understanding that an invasion would be necessary, and the aerial attacks 
were to soften the resistance. But after the great show of force from the March raids, 
LeMay and others became convinced that air power alone could compel the end of the 
war – and prove once and for all that the Air Force was worthy of co-equal standing with 
the Army and Navy. On April 25th, in the middle of the Okinawa invasion, LeMay cabled 
General Norstad: "I am influenced by the conviction that the present stage of 
development of the air war against Japan presents the AAF for the first time with the 
opportunity of proving the power of the strategic air arm…. I feel that the destruction of 
Japan's ability to wage war lies within the capability of this command”208 
 From June 15th until the dropping of the atomic bombs and the Japanese surrender, 
the Twentieth AF would embark on an incendiary campaign that can only be 
characterized as an assault on the morale and will of the Japanese people. “After 17 June, 
8,014 sorties, with a total of 54,184 tons of incendiaries, were sent against 58 secondary 
cities,” ones with generally insignificant connections to the war industry.209 The 
Twentieth had enough planes now, and the cities were small enough, to allow for 
multiple cities to be targeted per night. The command would drop leaflets a night before 
an attack with a list of twelve cities selected as targets, and the next night, six would be in 
flames. The remaining six came the following night. The purpose of this was twofold: 
most importantly, to show the citizens that the U.S. had complete control of the skies, and 
that even knowledge of the targets would not help the Japanese military defend them. The 
only option left was surrender. Second, but still important, was that by this time the 
Japanese people knew the horror of air attacks and trusted the AAF’s promises to attack. 
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Upon receiving the leaflets, many citizens evacuated the cities. This both reduced 
casualties and convinced many Japanese that, as the leaflets read, “in accordance with 
America's well-known humanitarian principles, the American Air Force…does not wish 
to injure innocent people.”210 This campaign was more radical than the phase one attacks 
because, for the first time (in the Pacific war, at least; OPERATION CLARION in Europe 
was in many ways similar to these attacks), the AAF was deliberately attacking civilians 
without affiliation to the war effort with the primary objective of undermining the 
nation’s morale and will to resist – not its ability to resist. 
Still, it is important to note that even during phase two, the Twentieth never gave 
up on precision attacks against the aircraft industry, and when weather permitted, they 
would use high explosives against those precision targets. The incendiary attacks did not 
replace strategic bombing, and from June to August, about 22 percent of the XXI sorties 
were precision attacks.211 LeMay simply beefed up the flagging strategic campaign and 
“supplemented and unspectacular precision bombing campaign with a stunningly 
successful urban incendiary campaign.”212 
 
Civilian Planners and the Incendiary Air War 
So much for the proximate precipitants for the abandonment of precision tactics in 
the war against Japan. Alone they provided compelling reasons to reevaluate the war 
plan. But it would be telling only half the story if we stopped here. As much as the 
immediate triggers were needed to push Arnold and LeMay over the edge, they did not 
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create the interest within the Air Force for incendiary attacks. As we saw, Norstad was 
instructing Hansell to carry out test incendiary attacks as early as November 1944 – long 
before the precision campaign could be proven to have failed. In fact, the War 
Department’s interests in incendiary bombs go back at least as far as February 1941 (and 
surely earlier), when the Chemical Warfare Service (CWS) – the contracting and 
procurement arm of the military – was instructed to begin working on “an oil filling for 
incendiary bombs.”213 
Two months later, the Chief of the Air Corps received a memo laying out the 
different sorts of incendiaries that could conceivably be produced for Air Corps use.214  
Thus, in order to fully appreciate the way in which area incendiary bombing developed 
within the Air Force and how it was able to fit into the strategic doctrine schema, we have 
to step back from the immediate causes that made a change necessary, and look at the 
longer trend on the institutional and policy planning levels that made the choice of 
incendiaries – particularly the highly effective M-69 – even possible. 
1942 is when our story begins. On March 9th of that year, the Air Corps was 
finally granted autonomy and became the Army Air Force, and General Arnold got to 
work building his fleet for war. Eight days later, he met with representatives of CWS and 
instructed them to develop “large numbers of the smaller types of incendiary bombs” to 
be made available as soon as possible. 215 Arnold wanted magnesium, thermate, and oil 
bombs, but due to the shortage of magnesium, especially wanted to focus on the latter 
two. Arnold explained that the Air Force would need large stocks of these bombs for use 
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in the theaters “with Japan as a final objective.” This should come as no surprise, because 
Japan’s vulnerability to fire had been known since the disastrous earthquake and fire of 
1923, and none other than Billy Mitchell had held forth about the susceptibility of the 
Japanese cities: “These towns are built largely of wood and paper…and form the greatest 
aerial targets the world has ever seen…. Incendiary projectiles would burn the cities to 
the ground in short order.”216 This should not imply that Arnold held a deep-seated desire 
to burn down the Japanese cities, especially because just months earlier he had signed off 
on AWPD-1, which codified precision strategic attacks. More likely, it is the first clue 
that incendiary bombing need not be necessarily in contradiction to strategic doctrine. 
In December of 1942, Arnold established the Committee of Operations Analysts 
(COA) to help develop targeting priorities for Europe and Japan. ACTS doctrine had 
created a targeting system that depended on identifying the central nodes of an enemy’s 
economy, and the COA, a group made up largely of civilians experienced in complex 
business and industrial decision-making and analysis, would fill that role.217 To the 
dismay of the Air Force’s own intelligence arm (A-2), the COA inhabited a crucial niche 
in the planning hierarchy, and the decisions they made regarding which targets were more 
important to the enemy’s war effort would factor very heavily in the military decisions of 
force allocation, targeting priorities, etc. The A-2 was unhappy both because their 
position was to an extent usurped, but more importantly because “much of that work took 
place outside regular military channels altogether, in the work of the [COA], men who 
had almost no firsthand contacts with war.”218 Military commitments were being decided 
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by a mostly civilian group whose members were unfamiliar with the actual war 
conditions. 
Guido R. Perera, a corporate attorney who was also a commissioned Colonel in 
the AAF was elected to lead the COA. Upon its incorporation in December of 1942 it 
was tasked with selecting targets for the European theater. A few months later, on March 
23rd, it was instructed to furnish a report on Japan as well.219 As they were just beginning 
their fact-finding regarding the nature of Japanese urban areas, another report had begun 
to circulate regarding the ease with which the M-69 could burn down Japanese cities. It 
had been written privately by Raymond Ewell, a 33 year old chemical engineer who 
worked for the National Defense Research Committee (NDRC), a civilian military 
research arm created by President Roosevelt on June 27th 1940 to “correlate and support 
scientific research on the mechanisms and devices of warfare.”220 The NDRC had been 
tasked to develop a small oil incendiary bomb, and by early 1943 they were convinced 
that what they had developed – the M-69 Napalm incendiary – was far and away the most 
effective fire-starter in the U.S. arsenal. Ewell, whose research was in the viscosity of 
fluids, had an obvious interest in the napalm weapon.221 Working under Richard P. 
Russell, vice president of the Standard Oil Development Company and the chief of 
Division 11 (Chemical Engineering) of the NDRC222, where incendiaries were 
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researched, Ewell became a fierce advocate of the M-69’s ability to easily incinerate 
Japanese structures. 
Already by September 1942, Ewell was speaking very favorably of the “Tail 
Ejection Oil Bombs” (they had yet to be standardized as the M-69) dedicating half of his 
12-page incendiary bombs report to it, while 5 other munitions had to share 6 pages.223 
Around the same time, Ewell and Russell left to England to tell the British about the 
results of their incendiary development, and to try and convince the RAF to choose M-
69s for their raids – a backhanded way to get the weapon into circulation in the war.224 
Upon their return, Russell sent a curious letter to Dr. Garner of Britain’s Petroleum 
Warfare Department. Commenting on what he understood to be an upcoming “shortage 
of incendiaries…particularly for the cold nights of this long winter and early spring,” he 
added that “R.A.F acceptance based on their tests with the 1,000 [M-69] bombs to be 
received in England…might leave us in a position to correct the shortage.” If the tone 
sounds suspicious, it is because it appears that Russell was trying to come to a quid-pro-
quo agreement with the British. If the British would send “word through official 
channels” about whether the M-69 would be useful for their attacks on German industry, 
and thereby get U.S. military support for the M-69, then Russell would be in a position to 
supply them to the British to ameliorate their bomb shortage.225 Of course, Russell was in 
no such position, because procurement and distribution was the purview of CWS – who 
did not always get along well with the NDRC. 
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Even more surprising is a memo Russell wrote for the U.S. Military on September 
15th. Deceptively titled “Memorandum on Incendiary Bomb Requirements,” what Russell 
really recommended was an immediate adoption of area incendiary attacks against 
civilian targets – this just six days after AWPD-42 reestablished precision bombing as the 
policy of the AAF. Russell – the vice president of Standard Oil, with no military 
expertise – opined: “Even more vital…then the mere temporary dislocation of an 
industrial target through the use of [high explosives] is the permanent fire destruction of 
the houses and essential civilian services for Germany’s war workers. These are, 
therefore, today regarded as the primary target for air attacks” (italics mine). He went on 
to add that the “new U.S. 6.2 lb. oil bomb [M-69] is, the N.D.R.C. group believes, several 
times as effective” as its competitor bomb against these targets. This observation, too, 
was based purely on conjecture, because the first tests against German (and Japanese) 
structures would only occur in mid-1943. Finally, as the coup-de-grace, Russell 
concluded that it was “indeed unfortunate that so few incendiary bombs are available to 
the RAF and U.S. Air Force.” 226 Implicitly tying the military necessity with the dearth of 
incendiaries, Russell was pushing the military to quickly bring his beloved M-69 into 
production and simultaneously attempting to shift its bombing doctrine to area attacks, so 
as to better suit the M-69’s use. All this before the COA took up the cause. Quite unusual 
for a chief of an organization meant simply to “support research.” 
The British do not appear to have been impressed and their own tests seriously 
questioned the M-69’s usability as an actual aerial bomb – not simply as a fire starter. 
They worried about its ability to penetrate German roofs and its poor aimability, two 
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problems which, in their conception, overrode the above-average fire-starting ability of 
the incendiary: if it doesn’t land on (or near) the target, it has no chance of destroying it. 
Ewell responded on December 11th 1942 with an impassioned defense of the bomb and a 
critique of the British tests, remarking that the U.S. had begun production of the weapon 
in October (so apparently Russell’s argument was convincing enough!), and called for 
new tests to determine the M-69’s usability.227 
These tests would begin in May 1943 at the military’s Dugway Proving Grounds 
in Utah, where mock Japanese and German structures were painstakingly and 
meticulously assembled to replicate – down to the interior décor – the conditions that 
these incendiaries could expect to encounter in the field (see Appendix for photos). 
Before these began, though, Ewell was already sending around the above-mentioned 
April report, in which he boldly claimed that only “10 tons of M-69’s would have the 
possibility of wiping out major portions of any of the large Japanese cities.”228 Like his 
associate Russell, Ewell based this on little hard evidence (indeed, he admitted that 
confirmation would need to wait for Dugway test results) and went on to prescribe his 
preferred method of aerial assault as well. He would send these sentiments on to Col. 
Perera of the COA, in hopes of getting his ideas incorporated into official AAF target 
directives. It is unknown if Perera looked at or acted on the memo, but it would soon be 
irrelevant.229 Ewell and Russell also were not alone in pushing fire attacks. Other 
civilians with vested interests in fires – such as Horatio Bond, Chief Engineer of the 
                                                
227 Ewell, “Tests of the M.69 Incendiary Bomb” 12/11/42, RG 175, entry 4M boxes 294-5, NARA. 
228 Quoted in Kerr, 24. 
229 Kerr, 25. 
 INCENDIARY WARS  99 
National Fire Protection Agency, who edited the 1946 compilation Fire and the Air War 
– also “relished the thought of war by fire.”230 
According to Perera’s memoir, in November 1943, Bond wrote a report very 
similar to Ewell’s, and claimed that 1,690 tons of incendiaries would destroy the 20 most 
important Japanese cities. The AAF Intelligence Wing (A-2) received the report very 
favorably.231 Perera claims to have opposed the idea, even though the COA included 
urban areas as one of six priorities for attack in the Far East. Indeed, his timeline is a little 
suspect, especially because already in May of 1943, the Plans Section had asked the A-2 
to prepare information on “the vulnerability of Japanese target areas to incendiary attack” 
to supplement their “Japanese Target Data” that they put out in March.232 This report, 
“Japan, Incendiary Attack Data,” was completed on October 15th – a month before 
Bond’s own report – and was written with the help of Raymond Ewell!233 
The result of this work was to get Ewell loaned to COA, which was at that 
moment completing its own targeting plan, one which as mentioned would include urban 
areas as one of six (non-ranked) strategic target priorities for Japan.234 What should be 
clear by this point is that Ewell did not know very much about the method by which the 
ACTS doctrine had evolved towards and decided upon precision doctrine, and frankly did 
not care. What he was interested in was finding a way to get the M-69 into higher 
production, and would accomplish that through embedding its use into the war plan. 
Unbeknownst to the war planners, Ewell, Russell, Bond, and their fellow civilian fire-
lovers were sowing the seeds for the reversal of precision strategic bombing. 
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However, there was a hiccup in the plan. While the COA by this point was 
committed to including urban attacks at least as an option for the Air Force, the Dugway 
results raised the question for the Air Force of whether the M-69 was the right tool for the 
job. While the M-69 proved to be a great fire-starter, its overall performance 
disappointed. It was concluded that 
“There is not a single standard incendiary munition… that is satisfactory, or sufficiently 
acceptable, for use in the principal mission of the Air Forces – the precision bombing attack of 
specific military and industrial targets…. Many of the personnel connected with incendiary 
development appeared unaware of Air Force directives and requirements for precision incendiary 
munitions”235 
 
A report from General Arnold’s staff was even more forward: “[the incendiaries] are not 
sufficiently accurate from a ballistic standpoint even for area bombing” (italics mine).236 
Of course, those involved with incendiary development knew very well what the 
AAF policy was – they just did not care. Russell had written to a fellow NDRC and 
Standard Oil man a few weeks earlier, cynically lamenting the fact that the AAF will 
claim that the M-69 is “usable not at all by the U.S. Air Force – all because it is alleged 
that the M-69 is even more difficult to lay on the target than the [very poor] M50.”237 
Russell’s attitude toward the AAF can be summed up by a somewhat tangential letter sent 
to his fellow NDRC chiefs regarding an M-69 bomb with a high explosive charge (called 
the M-69X) under development in the NDRC. After testing, it was found that an average 
of around 23 percent of the charges were malfunctioning – a clearly unacceptable rate. 
Instead, Russell tried to argue that this defect will be “found to be of real advantage” 
because the non-exploded charges will explode once reached by the growing fires, 
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allowing for a de-facto fuse of a much longer duration than they could construct.238 More 
important than having a well-made product up to the AAF specifications was to get the 
product that the NDRC had into production fast. This is not to cast either Russell or 
Ewell as nefarious characters – their aim was to help the war effort with a weapon they 
legitimately though was an excellent incendiary – and ultimately they were vindicated. 
However, though I found no evidence of corruption, it is not hard to imagine the desire of 
an oil company executive to produce large amounts of oil bombs, especially when that 
company was helping to build them as well. 
The final results of the Dugway tests were even more damning. On August 12th, 
1943, the Assistant Chief of Staff for Operations sent the following three-point memo to 
the Army Requirement Division. 
 1. The committee on the testing of chemical and incendiary bombs has reported that all of 
our incendiary bombs are absolutely inefficient and have caused fires only under the most 
favorable circumstances. 
 2. The fault lies in the bomb being (1) too small (2) poor ballistically and (3) unable to 
cause fires. 
3. It is directed that steps be taken toward the immediate development of a new type of 
incendiary bomb…also, steps should be taken to discontinue the manufacture of the inefficient 
projectiles we now have.239 
 
It is impossible to conceive of a greater condemnation of the M-69 – it could not hit its 
targets and could not start fires. It was worthless as a bomb. And yet, just a day later, 
Russell wrote to his boss, Dr. James Conant that “you will be interested to note the five-
fold superiority of the M-69 over the M50 for attack against Germany.”240 Three days 
later, orders were going out to cancel all M-69 shipments, and by early fall its production 
was terminated, not to be restarted until mid-1944, at which point a suitable “aimable 
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cluster” was developed to allow for the M-69 to reach its targets with any sort of 
accuracy.241 
This analysis of the development of the M-69 and the interaction between NDRC 
members and the A-2 and COA planners is not meant to discredit the M-69, and its 
results in Japan speak for itself regarding its capabilities. There is no question that 
ultimately it was a successful weapon. What is important is that for over two years during 
its development, it was unequivocally not an acceptable weapon by Air Force standards, 
and yet these non-military targeting groups – led by people like Russell, Ewell, and Bond 
– included it as the central aspect in deciding whether urban areas would be worthwhile 
targets for primary attack. It was through a decidedly non-military process and on a 
strikingly non-military basis that these plans came about. And yet based on these early 
planning papers emerged the October 1944 COA report that planned the Twentieth Air 
Force’s approach to attacking the Japanese mainland, in which, in the scenario in which 
ground invasion was to follow, the top three targets (in priority order) were (1) aircraft 
industry, (2) urban industrial areas, and (3) shipping.242 
I have argued, and still maintain, that incendiary bombing fit into the strategic 
framework as it was conceived. Still, it is impossible to ignore the fact that incendiary 
bombing entered the Air Force’s plan entirely oblivious to its implications for precision 
bombing. Surely, had the aimable clusters not been perfected at the tail end of 1944 – just 
in time to get out to the Marianas for LeMay’s use – then the March 9th raid would not 
have been as effective as it was and area bombing might never have taken off the way it 
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did. Similarly, had the weather and other proximate factors not shown the precision 
attacks on the aircraft factories to be such failures, there would have been no need to 
jump to the next-best target system. But even more than these contingencies, the very 
presence of urban areas within the Air Force target lists and the existence of the M-69 in 
sufficient amounts to cause the necessary damage was wholly dependent on the 






Building upon arguments established by Sherry and Schaffer, Thomas Searle has 
already argued forcefully and convincingly that, at the very least, the urban attack against 
Japan was not a shift in the practice of the AAF, because the radar bombings against 
Germany were area attacks in all but name. Radar accuracy in the ETO was incredibly 
poor, with roughly 4 percent of bombing landing within a mile of the target zone, so the 
AAF needed to find targets that were measured in miles, not feet.  “Effectively, that 
meant aiming at the centers of cities rather than at individual factories. In the last 
eighteen months of the war in Europe, the USAAF launched at least sixty-nine substantial 
raids (each comprised of at least one hundred heavy bombers), which dropped a total of 
almost sixty thousand tons of bombs on targets designated as the "city area" of twenty-
five different German cities.”243 Quoting the Air Force historians, Searle points out that, 
by these standards, "the aiming point,” and thus the so-call precision bombing, “became a 
highly theoretical term."244 While this explains the functional shift in AAF tactics in 
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Europe – and as I have argued, in the AAF policy, function was the lynchpin of doctrine 
– it does not account for the full scope of change which we understand to have been 
demonstrated by the Japanese attacks. This is because while attacks in Europe seemed 
like area attacks, the AAF still insisted they were precision attacks. In contrast, while the 
Japanese attacks were likewise portrayed as necessary and not simply the indiscriminate 
sowing of destruction, the notion of precision was more openly abandoned. 
This is a fundamental difference, because it shows that the Japanese urban attacks 
were still conceived of and operated within the confines of AAF policy, while the radar 
bombings of Europe appear to have to some extent existed outside of that conceptual 
framework. That is, Searle might argue that functionally, little changed from Europe, but 
might still have to concede that, therefore, both the European and Japanese attacks 
contravened AAF policy and perhaps should be considered morally corrupt. As I have 
argued in this paper, that view is not necessary, though the issue of morality can remain 
an open question. Whether it is really ever justifiable to target civilians remains a 
legitimate path of inquiry, though mostly for international lawyers, philosophers, and 
politicians – not the historian working with what actually occurred, rather than what he or 
she thinks should have occurred. Absent that question, I have demonstrated that the 
decision to attack urban areas was consistent with ACTS and AAF policy, perhaps not 
how some of its initial planners conceived of it (and became attached to), but surely how 
they conveyed it. Moreover, when the process by which urban areas came to be included 
in Air Force target priorities is understood, it is impossible to claim that the “Air Force” 
itself had a moment in which it decided to abandon precision bombing. It occurred 
gradually and largely outside of the official military structure. 
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Revisionist histories try to show a change in bombing policy from the highest 
echelons of the AAF and even try and show some sort of knowledge by FDR or his 
administration. They do this by citing memos that request reports on the effects of 
incendiary attacks on cities, letters between Arnold and his subordinates regarding 
incendiary attacks or ways to spin PR to avoid mentioning area attacks, and even the 
direct requests from Norstad to Hansell and LeMay to try incendiary test runs. All these 
memos are correct, and they surely show an interest and knowledge of using incendiaries 
and attacking urban centers. They also, however, miss the point. 
I argue that the mere request for incendiary research and questions about attacking 
Japanese cities did not imply a rejection of strategic bombing policy, nor did it 
necessarily mean a rejection of precision policy. It were these requests, ones that could 
easily fit within the precision attack rubric, that led to the creation of the COA and work 
by the NDRC on incendiaries, and it would be these non-military groups, once given the 
essentially harmless task of research, that would actually go about changing the targeting 
priorities of the AAF. Because ultimately the AAF plans depended on questions of 
efficiency to select between different methods and policies of attack, it would be the men 
who decided which targets were efficient that became the true deciders of policy. 
This set in motion a more subtle and unforeseeable process than the revisionists 
would like to portray. Indeed, the AAF generals did ask for incendiary attacks and morale 
did come into question here and there (though not functionally until after the major 
industries had been destroyed in the spring of 1945, when the AAF realized that they 
could win without invasion). But they emerged not from a rejection of AAF policy, but 
from following it – just not the manifestation of the policy with which they had entered 
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the war. There was nothing sinister in this decision, one which ultimately was made 
based on the operational reality facing LeMay in the Marianas. The important thing to 
understand, though, is how contingent, gradual, almost natural was the evolution – rather 
than the paradigm shift – of Army Air Force policy in World War Two. 
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Appendix: Dugway Testing Grounds Photos (Source: NARA) 
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